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Abstract
The objective of this thesis is to examine co-management as a tool for the 
integration of conservation and development at the local level. Integrated conservation 
and development projects, decentralization, devolution and community-based 
management approaches are examined to identify how conservation conflicts are 
resolved.
The co-management arrangement for the Galibi Nature Reserve, Suriname, is 
examined as an alternative approach. The co-management arrangement is examined 
based on how it resolves the problems with conservation and protected area management: 
integrating conservation and development at the local level, involving local populations 
in conservation and development and integrating state views of environmental 
management with local common property resource (CPR) management systems.
It is found that the Galibi co-management arrangement is effective at integrating 
conservation and development through the use of nature tourism. Local tourism 
developments are dependent on the successful conservation of the sea turtle. The co­
management arrangement is also effective at involving local populations in development 
and sea turtle conservation. Local participation is included beyond merely consultation, 
as in other approaches. Local objectives and concerns are incorporated into management 
decisions. The Galibi co-management arrangement has not been as effective at 
integrating state views of environmental management with CPR management. While the 
integration of local CPR management systems was not as important for sea turtle 
conservation, the integration o f local customs and values is important. The co­
management arrangement has been unable to integrate state views on property with local 
views on traditional land rights. Local views of traditional land include the Galibi Nature 
Reserve and traditional land rights are not legally recognized which is a source of conflict 
in conservation and development.
It is proposed that the co-management arrangement be strengthened by granting 
greater local control over conservation and development to local organizations, under the 
supervision of the government agency responsible for protected area management. By 
granting greater local control over what is considered to be traditional land, the conflicts 
associated with differing views on property rights may be reduced.
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Introduction
There have been many large-scale development projects, such as large scale dams 
funded by the World Bank (China's Three Gorges dam, Brazil's POLONOROESTE 
projects, India's Narmada Valley dams) which have been criticized for the low priority 
placed on environmental concerns and which have questionable development benefîts 
(Feamside, 1988). Based on these experiences, there has been a shift in development 
towards placing greater emphasis on the small scale, sustainable, grass roots, rural 
development projects.
The shift to small-scale rural development projects has mirrored the efforts of 
large environmental organizations such as the World Wildlife Fund and Conservation 
International. In the past, while focusing on mitigating the environmental effects in rural 
and "pristine " habitats, they paid little attention to local development implications. While 
striving to protect rainforests or to conserve biodiversity, environmental organizations 
have promoted the creation of parks and nature reserves to eliminate human impacts on 
the remaining natural areas of the world (Wells and Brandon, 1992). These parks and 
protected areas formerly placed restrictions on local populations in the form of fences and 
regulations that limit access to resources. However, such an approach has also changed to 
include the incorporation of local development activities in and around protected areas.
Many governments of developing countries face tough decisions of either 
exploiting natural resources to increase foreign reserves or to satisfy stringent 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) reforms, or of conserving natural resources and 
watching passively as others pass them on the economic ladder. Often, governments 
seeking to eliminate poverty feel they must do so at the expense o f the environment. The 
inverse is also true. Governments feel the pressure internationally to be environmentally
conscious, and do so, often at the expense of rural communities. These opposing options 
are an indication of the tensions created between the right of governments to exploit 
resources for their development and that of outsiders to deny the use of certain natural 
resources (Western and Wright, 1994).
The conservation of biodiversity in the form of protected areas and nature reserves 
has the effect of limiting or controlling access to resources. Since most rural communities 
in the developing world (and to a lesser extent in the developed world) base their 
economies on subsistence agriculture or the use of natural resources (to varying degrees), 
it is those communities that suffer the effects of conservation measures. Therefore, their 
economic/development options are limited, and they are often forced into "illegal" 
behaviour in the form of poaching and trespassing.
In Suriname, the Amerindian and Maroon communities have practiced, and 
continue to practice subsistence economies; they use the forests as resources for gathering 
materials, for hunting and for agriculture, and the numerous rivers and swamps for 
Hshing. With the establishment of national parks and protected areas in Suriname 
beginning in the mid 1950s, Amerindian and Maroon communities were suddenly seen as 
intruders who were directly opposed to conservation values (Kloos, 1971). Their 
traditional activities were limited by rules imposed in Paramaribo, and the resulting 
restrictions caused a reduction in incomes and freedoms, that were only aggravated further 
by the failure of the government to recognize their traditional land rights.
Local people were not involved with the siting of national parks or protected areas 
and were not consulted in the park management process. Therefore, local people received 
very few benefîts through the conservation of resources and had little incentive for 
conservation. Their traditional activities were suddenly considered illegal and resulted in
fines for trespassing and poaching. The Nature Conservation division of the Suriname 
Forest Service also had to invest in park guards and rangers to patrol and monitor such 
illegal activities, at a great expense. Attempts were made to provide jobs to rural 
residents in the forestry and mining sectors in an effort to integrate them into the national 
wage economy, but this had mixed results.
The resulting state of conflict between park management and local residents in 
Suriname is, therefore, not surprising. Nor is it unique. The same conflicts have been 
occurring throughout the world. The number of examples of people-park conflicts is 
endless, regardless of the type of park (for examples, see Wells and Brandon 1992 among 
others). International conservationists and park managers acknowledged the conflict in 
the 1980 World Conservation Strategy that emphasized the importance of creating 
economic opportunities for local communities (lUCN, 1980).
Since 1980, much effort has been placed on research into the integration of 
conservation and development initiatives in order to improve conservation outcomes. The 
balanced and integrated approach has also become the model for all international 
development activities. Efforts have been made to integrate local people directly into 
conservation and development activities through sustainable development.
Numerous methods have been used to attempt to involve local people in 
conservation projects and in development projects. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs) were seen as the most 
promising model to reduce conflicts between local people and park managers and to 
improve the protection of ecosystems. Governments, non government organizations 
(NCjO s), conservation organizations, international development organizations, and private 
foundations have all attempted, with mixed results, decentralization and devolution of
various aspects to the local level (Enters and Anderson, 1999). There have even been 
suggestions that what is needed is complete devolution to community management of 
resources, although very few actual working examples exist (Western and Wright, 1994).
Co-management is another potential method to integrate development and 
conservation goals and to overcome conflicts. Co-management agreements have been 
used successfully to integrate government and local resource use objectives in the 
management of national parks (Hawkes, 1996; DeLacy, 1993; Davis and Weiller, 1992; 
Richardson, 1992), forest reserves (Matose, 1997; Bruce et al., 1993) and fisheries 
(Pinkerton, 1996). In each example, co-management allowed for the integration of the 
objectives of various stakeholders (to varying degrees) to allow for more equitable 
management decisions and reduced conflict over resources. With co-management, local 
people can be directly involved in the management process and they are more involved in 
determining the costs and benefits, goals and methods of conservation and development.
The objective of this thesis is to examine co-management as a tool for the 
integration of conservation and development goals through the involvement of local 
people. There exists a wide range of co-management agreements that vary greatly in 
terms of the resources that are managed, the degree to which participation is shared and 
the degree to which the co-management agreement is institutionalized. There is 
significant interest, for the future design of co-management arrangements, in what 
elements are important, in how the agreements have evolved, their outcomes and the 
potential lessons that can be learned from them. Through an examination of the literature, 
theoretical propositions will be examined that will then be used to assess the co­
management agreement that is in use for the management of the Galibi Nature Reserve in 
Suriname. The relevance of these theoretical propositions will be investigated through the
5Galibi Nature Reserve example. It is my expectation that the co-management agreement 
for Galibi will provide incentives for both development and conservation goals to be 
achieved, thereby reducing the conflict between local residents and park management.
There are three main questions that guide this thesis. The first relates to the 
effectiveness of co-management for the integration of conservation and development 
objectives. The second question refers to the ability of co-management to lead to greater 
local participation. The fînal question relates to whether co-management allows for the 
integration of classical environmental management with local common property resource 
management systems.
Chapter One will examine modernization, dependency, Marxist and feminist 
theories of development with regard to participatory development. These theories of 
development provide the lens through which development activities take place and 
determine the goals and objectives of development. Therefore, the framework through 
which development is viewed leads to different development approaches, such as macro- 
and micro-economics, commodity production and community participation. In this 
chapter, a framework for analysis of participatory development will be suggested.
Chapter Two will examine conservation and protected area management. The 
problems encountered with conservation will be discussed, as will attempts to overcome 
such problems, including integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs), 
decentralization, devolution and community-based conservation.
Chapter Three is a discussion of co-management. Co-management will be defined 
and important aspects of co-management (linking conservation with development, local 
participation, common property resources and the problems co-management addresses) 
will be put forth as theoretical propositions.
The methods in Chapter Four will outline the rationale for the case study approach 
and provide a brief description of the case study location, the case study protocol, the 
scope and the limitations.
Chapter Five will be a description of the Galibi Nature Reserve as a case study. A 
history of the creation of the nature reserve will be followed by the park management 
framework in Suriname and a description of the co-management arrangement that exists 
for the nature reserve.
The analysis of the case study in Chapter Six will be based on the theoretical 
propositions on development from Moser (1991) (Chapter One) and those based on co­
management (Chapter Three).
The conclusions and recommendations in Chapter Seven will report the major 
findings of the thesis and suggest some recommendations. They will include both 
recommendations for government policy and local policy. Avenues for further research 
will also be recommended.
Chapter 1 
Development Theories
The term "development" has been defined in numerous ways based upon different 
theories about development. The term has been used variously to describe improvement 
of basic human needs, of improvement in the social, economic, environmental or political 
situation. The definitions used by different development theorists are based on very 
different assumptions about the methods and goals of development. The purpose of this 
section is to define development objectives and approaches based on the theory that is 
most suitable for participatory community development. Modernization, dependency, 
Marxist and Feminist theories of development will be examined briefly to demonstrate 
which theory is best suited for an examination of development at the local level. These 
four theories have been chosen because they are the dominant theories of development 
that represent both the assumptions of harmonic and discordant interests, animate and 
inanimate values and material and human resources (Black, 1991).
These four theories are the major development theories that share common 
assumptions about the possibility and desirability of development but which differ 
drastically in terms of how development should occur. Modernization, for example, 
views national economic interests as being similar to those of class interests while 
dependency and Marxist theories view them as competing (Black, 1991). The four 
development theories discussed place differing emphasis on the role of the nation state, 
international pressures and the individual. They also place different emphasis on how 
results are measured and thereby provide a glimpse of the broad spectrum of development 
theories.
1.1 Modernization Theory of Development
Modernization theory arose from the hegemonic power of the United States in the 
post- Second World War years. Due to the success of the Marshall Plan in the 
reconstruction of Europe, modernization was seen as a means for the Third World to 
develop. It was believed that the Third World could develop as quickly as Western and 
Eastern Europe had, immediately following the war. Its theoretical basis is structural- 
functionalist, with the belief that development will occur provided that the proper 
structures (capital, expanded trade and technical assistance) are in place for economic 
growth to occur (Preston, 1996). Modernization theory is best expressed in Rostow's 
"stages o f growth" model, which predicts that, once the proper structures are in place, 
development will progress through a linear path, from traditional society, to the pre­
conditions for take-off, to the take-off, to the drive to maturity and finally to the age of 
mass-consumption or development (Otubusin, 1992).
Modernization theory views the Third World as traditional. These societies are 
based on spiritual values, not values of self-betterment that are needed for improvement 
or development (Isbister, 1993). The traditional societies lack capital, which is seen as a 
major inhibitor to economic growth. Much of the early (1950-1970) development 
assistance that occurred in the third world was geared towards the generation of capital for 
domestic investment (Billet, 1993). As states become modernized, by accepting 
economic liberalism, Westem-style education and Western values, all sectors of society 
were expected to be improved.
Criticisms of modernization have been made on moral, political, economic and 
historical grounds (Otubusin, 1992). One of the major criticisms of modernization theory
is that it creates dichotomies: nations are developed or underdeveloped, modem or 
traditional. Modernization theory works from a technocratic point of view where 
development experts determine areas in need of modernization. The degree of modernity 
is equated with development. With the focus on modernity, information and ideas are 
highly technical and they flow from the technocratic elite at the top of society to those at 
the bottom. The effects are evident where states have put modernization policies in place. 
These policies can be characterized as generating economic growth in the major cities 
which results in greater urbanization. This focus of economic growth and modernization 
in the major cities, has often ignored rural areas, which are often in the most need of 
development assistance. According to modernization theory, rural agricultural areas will 
never achieve development because they are traditional, which characterizes them as 
undeveloped from a modernization point of view.
Modernization has been based on the assumption that recipients of development 
assistance are passive rather than active participants in the development process. 
Modernization theory does not acknowledge the different needs of rural areas in 
development. Its approach is strictly on a national level and it views each segment of a 
nation as needing to modernize their values in order to achieve development (Valenzuela 
and Valenzuela, 1998).
Therefore, the modernization theory of development is in direct conflict with the 
participatory approach to rural development. It limits participation to development 
experts, it focuses on modernization and urbanization to the exclusion of rural areas, and 
it assumes that development assistance should be focused on aiding modernity.
1.2 Dependency Theory of Development
Dependency theory has its roots in the United Nations Economic Commission for
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Latin America in the 1960s and it is based on the work of economists there who sought to 
place attention on the deterioration in terms of trade for primary producers in Latin 
America (Black, 1991). While Marxist theories of development seek to explain why and 
how the dominant classes expand their spheres of influence, dependency theorists 
examine what the relationship of unequal bargaining and exploitation means to the 
dominated classes in the dominated countries (Black, 1991).
Dependency theories of development are based on several major assumptions. 
Firstly, economic interests are the primary determinant of the distribution of power and 
status in the international arena. Culture and attitudes, what modernization theorists view 
as impediments to development, are irrelevant to dependency theorists (Nef, 1994). 
Secondly, the causes of underdevelopment cannot be determined by strictly examining 
processes at the national level. For dependency theorists, the root cause of 
underdevelopment is participation in the international economic system. The pattern of 
economic relations between dominant powers and their client states forces the latter to 
remain underdeveloped (Frank, 1992). Finally, contrary to the views of modernization 
theorists, the free market creates greater inequality rather than eliminating it. Trickle- 
down or diffusion of wealth does not occur with the absorption of individuals into the 
modem sector, but will, rather, cause increased inequalities (Isbister, 1993).
Dependency theories offer many examples of problems with modernization 
theory, yet there are no concrete approaches that are offered for development.
Dependency theorists suggest a revolutionary break from the global economic system that 
is promulgating dependency as a solution. Dependency theorists, as do modernization 
theorists, offer a structuralist theory of the causes of development and underdevelopment 
(Preston, 1996). They believe that the structural conditions of dependency will persist as
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long as the underdeveloped countries remain within the global system. Dependency 
theorists propose macro-economic changes that would weaken the effects of multi­
national corporations and foreign governments. They also propose the creation of trade 
barriers and regional trading areas that would allow nationalist governments to pursue 
goals of national development.
Presumably, with the dislocation from the global economic system. Third World 
governments could be free to pursue independent development projects that would 
involve rural populations and environmental conservation. However, the method that 
national governments use to pursue development is of little concern o f dependency 
theorists. The major concern is a critique of modernization and an attempt to persuade 
Third World governments to remove themselves from the conditions that perpetuate 
underdevelopment and dependency on other states for trade and development inputs.
Critics of the dependency approach to development point out that dependency 
theorists fail to demonstrate why the development of capitalism in the periphery will 
always result in an outflow of capital rather than internal capital accumulation (Browett, 
1985). Dependency theory has been seen as merely a description of the uneven 
distribution of capital and not an explanation as to the cause of this inequality. It has 
never challenged the dynamic and progressive characteristics of capitalism as it behaves 
in the global arena (Scott, 1995). Therefore, for dependency theorists, politics at the 
periphery include only those attributes which link the periphery to the international 
system. The focus of dependency theory on the macro-level linkages between nation 
states and the focus on independent national development make it irrelevant for 
participatory local development. The needs, desires and goals at the local level can vary 
greatly within a nation and dependency theory does not take such differences into
12
consideration.
1.3 Marxist Theory of Development
While dependency theorists draw much of their conclusions from theories 
developed by Marx, and many would consider themselves Marxist, contemporary Marxist 
theorists of development are in disagreement with both modernization and dependency 
theories. The basis of Marxism is the analysis of the class structures of Third World 
societies rather than economic growth and modernity (as in modernization theory) or 
foreign domination (as in dependency theory) (Isbister, 1993). Marxist theories of 
development revolve around the forces and relations of production. Marxist analysis 
focuses on production relations that are the key structures, which determines how society 
functions (Peet and Watts, 1993).
There are a number of fundamental differences between Marxist theories of 
development and those of dependency. First, Marxists see the fundamental forces for 
social change as being internal rather than external to Third World societies (Isbister, 
1993). Secondly, Marxists argue that economic growth is possible for Third World 
countries within the global system. The neo-colonial forces, which dependency theorists 
see as perpetuating underdevelopment, can act in a manner that would actually propel 
Third World societies along the path towards capital growth (Isbister, 1993).
Marxist analysis focuses on the primacy of the state in bringing about change. The 
analysis remains in an economic framework that places the instruments of change in the 
hands of the state and in elites of the South to counter the capital accumulation of the 
North (Braidotti et al., 1994). Essentially, for Marxist development theorists, the conflict 
between the capitalist and working class has been transformed into a conflict between 
North and South.
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Marxism does not prescribe how development is likely to occur, but rather why 
social change will occur. It is believed that social change will create new structures that 
will incorporate a redistribution of wealth and therefore, development. Social change is 
the result of conflict that arises between classes that have different relationships to the 
productive structure of society.
Criticisms of Marxist theories of development occur along the same lines as those 
of modernization and dependency. Marxism promotes a re-ordering of the global 
economic system in favour of Third World countries as a result of changes in the 
capitalist production centre at a national level. Marxism, along with modernization and 
dependency, is a structural approach on a global level that does not account for changes in 
non-state organizations or changes in individuals. Therefore, the perpetuation of 
inequality and injustice is not addressed at these levels and there exists blindness towards 
the needs of grassroots and intermediary levels of change (Braidotti et al., 1994).
With emphasis placed on the role of global capitalism, other factors that shape and 
determine local cultures and societies are ignored. Such factors include conflicts 
surrounding the low-level politics of rural inhabitants' struggles over access to 
environmental resources in their everyday lives. Macro-structural approaches dismiss 
local differentiation among resource users, differentiation that occurs along lines of class, 
ethnicity, age and gender (Moore, 1996).
1.4 Feminist Theory of Development
Feminist theories cover a wide range of views and place importance on various 
elements and structures that determine how and where development occurs. Multi-lateral 
rather than unilateral models are used which define the interdependent linkages that exist 
both within and across national borders. Feminism represents a critique of prevailing
14
gender-based power structures and the accepted norms and values which are used to 
define women and men (Whitworth, 1994). At its fundamental root, feminism is directed 
at transforming the unequal power relationship that exists between women and men. 
Feminist development theorists define the economic, materialistic and positivistic 
approaches to development put forth by the dominant development theories as limiting 
development. Rather, feminist theorists believe that development analysis should begin 
with the micro-level experiences of poor women living in the Third World and that these 
experiences are linked to the macro-economic level. The assumption is that experiences 
at the micro-level should inform macro-level analysis (Braidotti et al., 1994).
Feminist development theory is critical of other development approaches because 
of the lack of emphasis that is placed on those people on the margins, who are in the most 
need of development assistance. By examining how gender relations have resulted in 
current marginality, the linkages between local level and larger political and economic 
forces are revealed (Stivens, 1994). Examination o f these linkages results in a more 
encompassing theory of development that considers how development or 
underdevelopment affects those located on the margins of society. The post-modern 
feminist approach to development offers new potential and direction to development 
because of its pluralist approach. The limits to modernization, dependency and Marxism 
have created a new interest in the informal sector, popular participation, female 
production and ecology - elements that have been ignored by previous development 
theories (Scott, 1995). This new interest has refocused attention on the dominant theories 
of development not as to how they "provide the answer or solution to the women question 
[but how the] dominant theories, and their implicit biases, are themselves part of the 
problem" (Gatens in Pearson and Jackson, 1998:12).
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Feminist theories of development also place an increased importance on civil 
institutions. Their importance in development has been noted because of their ability to 
overcome the failings of authoritarian and bureaucratic development. The failings of the 
state are noted: "when the state fails to deliver public goods [or] minimum basic needs 
and democratic rights, civil organizations may fîll the vacuum" (Peet and Watts 1993: 
236). It is not surprising therefore, that by replacing the state-centric focus of 
development with other internal institutions, a degree of populism results. The appeal of 
populism results from its ability to work within any given structural framework to achieve 
a pragmatic, rather than solely a political agenda. It is in this area that feminist 
development theory possesses the greatest strengths. It is able to circumvent political 
structures in its focus of household-level development and its goal of development for the 
ordinary person.
Feminist theories focus on individual level decisions, grass-roots civil institutions 
and public participation as the methods through which development should occur. 
Therefore, feminist theories of development provide the best framework through which to 
examine participatory development and conservation at the local level, which will be 
discussed in the following section.
IJ  Feminist Framework for Participatory Conservation and Development
Moser (1991) provides a feminist framework for planning in the Third World that 
can be applied to participatory local development and conservation. Within this 
framework, four elements are identified as important for effective development planning 
and they include: decision-making power, highlighting of complexities, differentiation 
between strategic and practical needs, and shift from welfare to empowerment in 
development.
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Decision-making power is important for any participatory project. If decision­
making powers remain centralized in one state authority, it is inevitable that decisions will 
not reflect the needs of those who are affected by decisions. The importance of decision­
making power is based on the assumption that development planning needs to be locally 
specific. The basis of this assumption rests on whether or not planning for development 
can be done generally, or if it is necessary to focus on locally specific rural development. 
The same assumption applies in conservation. Conservation programs can not be limited 
to parks and protected areas, but must also involve communities (Little, 1994). Decision­
making power is important at all levels of development planning. It is important to note 
who is determining what the specific requirements of development are and how those 
requirements will be implemented. The feminist framework argues that men and women 
have different roles in society and therefore they have different needs (Moser, 1991). The 
same is true for development and conservation on a local basis. Needs vary on a local 
level and therefore development can only occur when the people it affects participate in 
the design of proposed policies and where the model which is implemented corresponds 
to local people's aspirations (Peet and Watts, 1993).
Another important aspect in the feminist framework for development that can be 
applied to participatory development and conservation is the aspect of simplifying 
relations so that methodological tools can be developed and implemented (Moser, 1991). 
Rather than highlighting complex relationships, focus should be placed on simplified 
connections between individuals and groups. By simplifying relationships, it can be 
determined who has power over decisions, who needs to have power and the connections 
and decision-making relationships become clearer. By knowing these connections, 
relationships can be understood and the development and implementation of ideas can
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proceed in any situation.
A third aspect that is important in development planning is the differentiation 
between strategic and practical needs. While both needs must be satisfied for effective 
development planning, strategic and practical needs must be approached differently. 
Practical needs are those needs such as housing, services, food, shelter, access to 
resources, but which do not focus on challenges to the existing system. Strategic needs 
for development seek to overcome obstacles to development. It is only through the 
fulfilment of strategic needs that practical needs can be fulfilled over the long term. The 
Grameen Bank in Bangladesh provides an example of how a practical need (employment 
for women) is met only through meeting the strategic needs (enabling women to control 
the loans they receive and to contribute to family support) (Hashemi et al., 1996). Focus 
on strategic needs aims at an alternative, more equal and satisfactory organization of 
society that overcomes the burdens that have prevented the realization of practical 
development needs in the past. The example that Moser (1991) uses is in the area of 
employment planning for women. It is insufficient to provide employment for women (a 
practical need) without providing for strategic needs such as a household and community 
support system that would allow women to enter the workforce.
Finally, focus in development planning must shift from a welfare perspective to 
one of empowerment. With the welfare approach to development planning, local people 
are seen as passive recipients of development assistance. Practical development needs are 
met through handouts of technology (such as wells, fertilizer, pesticides, housing, etc.), 
that occur in a hierarchical, top-down nature. The welfare approach does not include any 
participation and does not challenge the existing structures that inhibit development.
For successful participatory development, it is assumed that a shift from the
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welfare approach to an empowerment approach must occur. The purpose o f  the 
empowerment approach is for the residents o f tlie Third World to define their 
development needs. Such a goal is to be achieved through greater self-reliance. The 
empowerment approach seeks to meet strategic development needs through bottom-up 
mobilization around practical development needs (Moser, 1993).
While elements o f a feminist development framework were used, it is not within 
the scope o f this thesis to undertake a gender analysis o f the Galibi case study. There are 
a number o f elements that can be extracted firom feminist development theory which are 
applicable to participatory conservation. The emphasis on the individual, on grass-roots 
civil institutions, empowerment and on public participation are all elements that are 
important in participatory conservation. These elements provide the fi-amework through 
which participatory conservation and development are examined. The following chapter 
examines the conflicts in conservation and protected area management with these 
elements in mind.
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Chapter 2 
Conservation and Protected Area Management
When national parks and other protected areas (nature reserves, game reserves, 
conservation areas) were first created in Suriname, as elsewhere, the primary concern was 
with preservation o f the natural enviroiunent. In an attempt to save natural wonders, 
wildlife, biodiversity and ecosystems, protected areas were created which attempted to 
eliminate human impacts on the area. The preservationist paradigm which guided 
protected area management placed the activities o f humans in direct conflict with 
conservation objectives (Feamside, 1999).
Over time, it was acknowledged that successful conservation efforts required the 
support and participation of local people. With the change in perception o f local people, 
a number o f  new models/paradigms for protected area management have been proposed 
(e.g. Integrated Conservation and Development Projects, decentralization, devolution, 
community-based management).
In this chapter, the problems with traditional protected area management will be 
discussed as will the need for a more integrated approach to conservation. Integrated 
Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs) are one approach that have generated 
much enthusiasm. The concept o f ICDPs will be examined, as well as attempts at 
decentralization, devolution and commimity-based management o f  protected areas to 
overcome park management conflicts.
2.1 Problems with Protected Area Management:
The basis o f  traditional protected area management was the preservation o f the 
natural environment through the exclusion o f negative human impacts. Such a view is
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evident through an examination of park management plans and the old defînition of 
protected areas by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (lUCN). The 
lUCN (1975) defined protected areas as large areas where ecosystems are not altered by 
human exploitation and occupation and where authority has been taken to eliminate 
exploitation and occupation and enforce effectively the respect of ecological, 
geomorphological or aesthetic features [emphasis added]. While there has been much 
effort on the part of organizations such as the lUCN to change the view of protected areas 
over the years, the idea of preservation has remained at the forefront until recently. As 
recently as 1990, the Conservation Action Plan fo r  Suriname (1990) for example, stated 
the purpose of conservation as to maintain biodiversity and to maximize tourism and 
scientific research. The emphasis is placed on guards, patrols, preservation and the 
exclusion of all activities unrelated to tourism or research.
Traditionally, government-controlled protected area management excluded other 
stakeholders, objectives other than conservation, and social, political and economic forces 
(Wells and Brandon, 1992). In excluding all of the above, conflicts were created between 
park managers and local people who were only involved in park management activities to 
the degree that it was useful for park managers.
Enters and Anderson (1999) describe why a more integrated approach to 
biodiversity conservation is needed. They are critical of the vision held by developed 
nations of an untouched wilderness void of any human impact as the basis for global 
conservation policies. Under this conventional approach to conservation, local 
communities are considered threats to conservation and are treated as such. The 
implementation of management plans proceeds through a combination of encouragement 
and more coercive activities aimed at limiting the actions of local populations (Enters and
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Anderson, 1999). Under such situations, the national government is seen as the guardian 
of biodiversity and it has complete sovereignty and control over all conservation 
activities.
Bryant and Wilson (1998) criticize state-led environmental management because it 
allows for local participation and integration of local knowledge only if it can be 
controlled. A complete rethinking of the field is necessary that would include a broader 
understanding from a wider range of fields of knowledge so that humans are 
reincorporated into the environment.
Bryant and Wilson (1998) describe how the technocratic field of environmental 
management focuses on providing technical information for practical environmental 
management with very little effort or attention paid to the understanding of cultural, 
political or economic considerations at the local level. As such, four main criticisms of 
state-led environmental management are that it often ignores the interdependency of the 
environment, it imposes top-down, bureaucratic solutions on people, it follows a positivist 
approach that only allows experts to define environmental problems, and it is based on the 
assumption that environmental problems can be solved through technology without any 
modification to broader social, political or economic forces. It is interesting to note that 
criticisms of environmental management parallel those of development as discussed 
above. In resource management, attention is focused on increasing the involvement o f the 
principal resource users, and therefore the major beneficiaries in critical resource 
management decisions (Doulman, 1993) while development has been focused on meeting 
locals needs through local participation (Little, 1994).
There are two separate, but related issues that need to be addressed in rethinking 
environmental management. The first involves how the environment is viewed. While
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the environment is no longer viewed as its own entity, but as a set of interconnected 
issues, state led environmental management has still maintained a functional approach 
aimed at resolving environmental problems (Bryant and Wilson, 1998). The 
technocentric approach to environmental management is based on the assumption that 
environmental problems can be solved without the modification of broader political, 
social or economic forces. It has become increasingly obvious that successful 
conservation measures must be linked to local development (Wells and Brandon, 1992), 
local people (Hackel, 1993) and local economies (Viet et al., 1995).
The second issue that must be addressed in state-led environmental management 
relates to who controls and participates in environmental management. Environmental 
management is seen as a process in which experts apply their environmental expertise in 
the resolution of selected environmental problems. The view is that environmental 
management is a hierarchical process which needs to be imposed upon people living in a 
defined area (Bryant and Wilson, 1998). State-led environmental management is not 
interested in complete understanding of specifically located situations, but in partial 
understandings of widely dispersed but similar situations that can be covered by broad 
policies (Kloppenburg, 1991). Therefore, it is viewed as a practice that can not be 
associated with stakeholders other than those in the bureaucracy and it ignores traditional 
or local environmental knowledge.
Beckley (1998), while describing forestry management, describes the crisis that is 
occurring in management circles as one where greater accountability is being desired on 
behalf of the public, as well as a growing preference for broader management goals that 
allow for multiple benefits to multiple stakeholders. The problems that arise are based 
upon decisions being made at arms-length of actual resource use, the decision making
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structure is hierarchical and often does not allow for input from the local level and the 
scope of management objectives is narrow, often focused on a single issue.
However, participation of other stakeholders has been deemed an essential 
component for successful environmental management. Gadgil et al. (1993) demonstrate 
the relationship that exists between local people and their environments. Local people 
depend on the ecological services provided by the environment, and therefore, have the 
knowledge and motivation to sustain them. Such a relationship between humans and their 
environment, however, has been excluded from state management systems. The 
exclusion of local actors in environmental management often results in the 
implementation of policies and decisions by state decision makers who themselves rarely 
experience the effects of those decisions (Bryant and Wilson, 1998). As a result, 
decisions may be based on incomplete information about the locally specific environment, 
incompatible objectives and divergent ways of understanding the environment.
Much of the criticism surrounding past environmental management rests on its 
failure to incorporate the environment into social, political or economic sectors and the 
failure to address the needs of local people. The obvious solution to such criticism is to 
create a management framework that incorporates more inclusive management, that 
integrates different management objectives and that allows for greater participation from 
all interested stakeholders in the management process. In many circles, the top-down 
exclusionary approach to management has been abandoned in favour of management 
procedures that place greater emphasis on local participation through integrated 
conservation and development projects (ICDPs), decentralization, devolution, community 
management and co-management. However, the implementation of such ideas/methods 
creates many new problems relating to who is involved, what people are involved with
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and what the objectives are. While ICDPs, decentralization, devolution and community- 
based approaches all deal with the same issues, they all place different emphasis on 
different elements, objectives and involvement, in order to remedy the current problems 
with environmental management.
2.2 Integrated Conservation and Development Projects:
The strategy of linking protected area management with economic activities for 
local communities gained international acceptance with UNESCO's Man and Biosphere 
(MAE) project of the mid I970's and through the World Conservation Strategy in 1980 
(lUCN, 1980). The MAE emerged as a follow-up to the International Biological 
programme sponsored by the International Council of Scientific Unions to promote 
further ecological research in order to better manage ecological resources (Francis, 1985). 
The MAE was an international programme of scientific cooperation dealing with people- 
environment interactions through the whole range of global biospheres (Bâtisse, 1985). 
Through the MAE projects, there emerged a new concept in protected area management, 
the biosphere reserve. Bâtisse (1982) states the primary objectives of biosphere reserves 
as:
1) To conserve for present and future use the diversity and integrity of biotic 
communities;
2) To provide areas for ecological and environmental research; and
3) To provide facilities for education and training.
From such objectives, it is obvious that the movement in protected area management has 
shifted from a strictly preservationist approach to one of conservation, education and 
research.
The biosphere reserve consists of a core, undisturbed area surrounded by a buffer
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zone which is managed with minimal human activities. It is in these buffer zones where
"area managers and local residents in or near the biosphere reserve should be involved in
consultations... Managers and residents may also have to help with the implementation of
research projects...(Francis, 1985: 26)." The type of benefits that were provided for local
residents are focussed on scientific research. For example, socio-economic projects that
have been carried out with close cooperation from local residents include soil, water and
primary productivity analyses in the review by Francis (1985). The primary objectives of
biosphere reserves, as stated by Bâtisse (1982), mention nothing about the integration of
local communities except in ways that can aid scientific research.
The overall approach of the MAE Programme was to associate local populations
with the formulation and implementation of research projects. The biosphere reserve
concept shows that:
when the populations are fully informed of the objectives of the biosphere 
reserve, and understand that it is in their own and their children's interest to 
care for its functioning, the problem of protection is largely solved. In this 
manner, the biosphere reserve becomes fully integrated - not only into the 
surrounding land-use system, but also into its social, economic and cultural 
reality (Bâtisse, 1982: 107).
However, the MAB Programme did not adequately deal with the problems of local
participation, top-down scientific approaches, the integration of conservation into local
social, political and economical sectors, or addressing the needs of local people. The
MAB Programmes and biosphere reserves were considered a success when they produced
biodiversity conservation results (Lasserre and Hadley, 1997). Local people were
consulted or informed of the objectives of biosphere reserves and were able to participate
in research projects deemed important by the international scientific community. Local
preferences are only considered if they match the pre-determined goals of biodiversity
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conservation.
The MAB programme and the biosphere reserve concept reflect a more integrated 
approach to conservation that allows for the wise use of the environment, from the merely 
preservationist attitude. The more integrated approach is evident through the multiple 
objectives of biosphere reserves (conservation, education and research). However, the 
presence of continual conflict between local residents and protected area managers created 
a need for greater focus on local development. With the development of integrated 
conservation and development projects (ICDPs) in the mid I980's, an attempt was made 
to actually incorporate development objectives within park management plans in order to 
reconcile conservation, social and economic objectives (Wells and Brandon, 1992).
Integrated conservation and development projects can be defined as projects that 
link biodiversity conservation in protected areas with local socio-economic development 
(Wells and Brandon, 1992). The link between conservation and development is a result 
of providing alternative sources of income to discourage resource use. With ICDPs the 
primary objective is biodiversity conservation. Conservation objectives override local 
development objectives if there is conflict and ICDPs should be projects where almost all 
investments and activities should be directed at biodiversity conservation (Sanjayan et al.,
1997). Ideally, ICDPs establish a pattern of sustainable use of resources so that pressures 
on protected areas from local residents are voluntarily reduced.
Integrated conservation and development projects involve three different activities 
which portray their link to the MAB and biosphere reserve concept. The first activity is 
protected area management which includes biological monitoring and research, 
enforcement and conservation education. The second activity is buffer zone management 
around the protected area. Buffer zones are areas peripheral to a national park or reserve
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where less stringent restrictions are placed on land use, which give an added layer of 
protection to the park or reserve while allowing for both conservation and development 
needs to be carried out (Slocombe, 1992). The third activity that ICDPs perform are local 
social and economic development activities. Such activities are similar to rural 
development projects and they rely on compensation to local populations for park 
management restrictions or substitution for traditional economic activities (Wells and 
Brandon, 1992).
The main aspect that differentiates ICDPs from classical environmental 
management is ICDP s focus on poverty. The central assumption of ICDPs is that poverty 
leads to resource degradation by residents near conservation areas (Gezon, 1997). 
Therefore, the goals of economic development by ICDPs is twofold. The first goal is to 
create conditions where development can occur in peripheral zones which a positive 
influence on conservation and the second goal is to involve local populations so as to 
create partners in conservation.
Peters (1998) describes an ICDP situated around Ranomafana National Park in 
Madagascar. The ICDP initiated a policy to share half of the national park entrance fees 
with local residents to demonstrate the benefits of conservation. The goal of the policy 
was to create new management parmerships between park management and local people 
and to make the conservation of nature economically beneficial to local people. In the 
beginning, however, local people were simply passive recipients of entrance fee revenues. 
The resulting situation could be described as the welfare approach to development where 
people are passive rather than active participants in development, and where the main 
method of implementation is the top-down hand-out of goods and services (Moser, 1991). 
Local residents were merely compensated for the restrictions placed upon them by the
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national park (although they are involved in decisions of what to do with their portion of 
revenues) and do not participate in the actual management decisions of the park.
Many ICDPs treat local residents in the same way. In their review of fourteen 
ICDPs throughout the world, Weils and Brandon (1992) describe few projects that 
specifically outlined what was meant by public participation and most treated local people 
as passive beneficiaries rather than active participants. It is often the case that ICDPs use 
the lure of short-term benefits to obtain credibility which then substitutes for the more 
difficult process of involving communities in project design and implementation over the 
longer term (West, 1991).
West (1991) notes that while there has been a move away from the preservationist 
and isolationist view of protected areas, the adoption of cultural preservation and 
eco-development has often been co-opted. In an overview of tourism as a form of eco- 
development. West warns against "the blind promises of economic development to local 
residents from tourism revenues without an understanding of the social conditions under 
which tourism can provide benefits to local people (1991: 390)." The promise of 
economic development through tourism is often used to sell the idea of conservation to 
local residents.
While the ICDP approach is an improvement over traditional park management 
techniques, it still isolates local people outside of the core conservation zone by placing 
the greatest emphasis on biodiversity conservation (Wells and Brandon, 1992). Many of 
the problems with traditional protected area management have not been addressed. While 
the link has been made between conservation and development, many of the problems 
associated with traditional protected area management remain. Integrated conservation 
and development projects still rely on the trickle down theory of development and still
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rely on the top-down approach where local people are given responsibility to follow 
conservation objectives but they are not involved in the determination of such objectives. 
The problems with traditional park management still exist, (exclusionary, top down, 
hierarchical) and they are incorporated into development models based on the same 
approach (i.e., modernization theory). It is still a technocratic process where participation 
is limited to involvement with conservation objectives driven by the conservation agenda 
of the organization/state. Goals, objectives and methods of implementation are still set by 
protected area authorities and local residents are given the opportunity to participate with 
the predetermined goals.
The problem with ICDPs is that they do not try to involve local people in 
conservation, but rather attempt to involve them in other activities away from the core 
park area. The priority is still on protecting the park or reserve firstly, and benefiting 
local people secondly. Such a view highlights the key difference between a focus on 
development (improve living standards and eliminating poverty) and ICDPs (conserve 
biodiversity).
The focus of the ICDP is of the management for the conservation of biodiversity 
while providing and defining limited opportunities for local development. The emphasis 
is placed on conservation that may have the spin-off effect of creating opportunities for 
sustainable development for local populations. Such an approach ignores both the desires 
of local people and the need and potential for local development that could have the spin­
off effect of conservation. When local people are left out of the decision-making process, 
greater conflicts occur and neither conservation nor development objectives can be 
achieved. Such a problem is not isolated to ICDPs, but to the larger framework under 
which they operate.
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2.3 Decentralization, Devolution and Conununity>Based Approaches
There have been many attempts to achieve greater involvement of local 
populations in conservation and environmental management. The terms decentralization, 
devolution and community-based management appear frequently in discussions about 
policies and practices aimed at sustainable development (Fisher, 1999). Each approach 
exists on a continuum of local participation, from strict government control to complete 
community control, that is best represented by Amstein's (1969) "ladder of citizen 
participation " and modified by Berkes et al., (1991) and Matose, (1997) (Table 1). In 
Amstein s model, the levels of local participation are represented as rungs on a ladder 
ranging from non-participation, to tokenism and to degrees of citizen control. While 
decentralization, devolution and community-based management are used to generate 
greater local participation, what they actually achieve vary with regard to the involvement 
of local people, the objectives, the outcomes and the associated problems in each 
approach.
Decentralization is one method used by government park policy makers to 
overcome the problems created by management decisions made at a great distance from 
parks. Decentralization implies the de-concentration of authority to lower levels within 
the government structure in order to bring government managers closer to resource users 
(Otto and Elbow, 1994). It engages local government authorities to legitimate 
management regimes, adjudicate disputes and enforce decisions with greater knowledge 
about the local situation.
Any effort to increase local participation in policy decisions usually requires some 
form of decentralization (Little, 1994). With decentralization, management functions are 
shifted from a central bureaucracy to regional or local offices of the same bureaucracy.
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While decentralization does increase local participation by informing and consulting local 
people, it often results in tokenism. The decentralization of authority occurs, but the 
decision-making power remains at the centre which results in continued control by the 
centre as central authorities carry out policies and programs through representatives in 
local areas (Little, 1994).
In an example of protected area management in India (Badola, 1999), 
decentralization has led to local people being responsible for the protection of resources 
but they are not given access to them or the ability to change the rules of protection. Such 
is a common criticism of decentralization. The tendency has been for governments to 
pass responsibility for conservation to local governments, communities or bureaucracies 
without the authority to make independent decisions or to take action outside of the 
parameters and objectives set by the central government (Fisher, 1999). Local resource 
users lose confidence and trust in state and local institutions abilities and interest to 
regulate resource use. With the adherence to state and local resource use institutions, the 
influence of traditional common property resource (CPR) systems is reduced. With the 
loss o f confidence in state and local resource use institutions, there is no other resource 
management system to rely on which can lead to open access to resources. This results in 
the degradation of common property resource systems to open access systems, which 
leads to further environmental degradation (Little, 1994).
In order to overcome such problems, it is necessary to determine to what degree 
decentralization occurs. Indicators of genuine decentralization include; the extent to 
which decisions are given to local authorities, the extent to which the community has 
authority to negotiate with external bodies and the extent to which the community has 
power to exert sanctions and to reward resource users (Little, 1994). These indicators
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denote the level to which decision-making power has been decentralized to local users.
Decentralization of authority to more local levels of government is not the same as 
the devolution of rights to communities (Feldmann, 1994). The distinction between 
decentralization and devolution centres on the element of empowerment. In many cases 
where decentralization has failed, it has been as a result of the reluctance of central 
government authorities to relinquish real power (Fisher, 1999).
Devolution is the actual transfer of power away from central authorities to local 
authorities. The goal of devolution is to overcome the problems of decentralization by 
transferring not simply responsibility for resource management but also the ability to 
make real input into the setting of objectives and the defining of priorities. It is a step up 
on Amstein's ladder of citizen participation (Table 1). With actual devolution, local 
communities and government authorities enter a partnership that enables them to 
negotiate and engage in trade-offs to achieve desired objectives (Berkes, 1991).
The same process is involved with devolution as with decentralization, however, 
authorities at the local level have greater power in decision making, in setting objectives 
and in defining priorities. The Nunavut Wildlife Management Board (NWMB) is one 
example where devolution from national/territorial government resource management to 
community hunting and trapping organizations has occurred through the NWMB for the 
management Beluga whale quotas.
The NWMB has the responsibility and authority to make decisions on Beluga 
whale quotas and the local hunting and trapping organizations allocate the quota to 
community hunters (Rodon, 1998). While the ultimate authority for wildlife management 
rests with the governments of Nunavut and Canada, the NWMB is the decision-making
Table 1 : Ladder o f  Citizen Participation (adapted from Amstein, 1969; Berkes et al., 1991 ; Matose, 1997)
Degrees o f  Cii izen Power Characteristics Type o f  Management
Citizen
empowerment
Community
Control
Local commimity governs the program and is in 
charge o f  policy and managerial aspects; 
mechanisms exist for consultation with central 
authorities but ultimate authority rests with local 
institutions. Complete community control o f  
resource management
Community-based 
management based on 
community traditions, 
values and objectives.
Empowered
Control
Local community has opportunity to set its own 
objective and implement its own plans. 
Institutionalized mechanisms exist for consensus 
decision-making with government authorities.
Devolution
Decentralization/
Tokenism
Partnership Power is redistributed through negotiation between 
goverrunent and local community who share jointly 
in planning and decision-making.
Advisory Panel Local corrunimity concerns are sought and 
considered in management, local participants are 
included in plarming yet government retains the 
right to judge plarming decisions.
Decentralization
Voice Local participants have an opportunity to voice 
opinions about management decisions but there is 
no guarantee that those opinions will be considered.
Non-participation
Inform/Educate Goal is to  educate local residents o f  the rules and 
regulations and to inform them o f  their options. 
Local participation is excluded from management 
decisions.
Strictly government 
management based on 
government values 
and objectives.
Co­
management
can
encompass 
any o f  these 
types o f  
management 
depending on 
the particular 
agreement.
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body and the government's role is to carry out NWMB decisions (NWMB, 2(X)l). The 
management of the Beluga whale harvest has been completely devolved to the local level. 
The NWMB is responsible for the use of scientific and traditional research to set quotas, 
to allocate the quotas and to enforce the quota levels.
Since devolution involves the potential for changes in objectives at the local level, 
the central government authority must be willing to accept such changes and even modify 
their own objectives. In order for the acceptance of changes by the central authority, a 
significant degree of trust in local management must exist. It is not only decision making 
power that must be devolved but also accountability. If local communities are to 
participate in decision-making roles in resource management, they must be prepared to 
accept long-term accountability for the state of those resources (Feldmann, 1994).
Devolution involves people in all elements of management, from the definition of 
priorities to the implementation of programs. With the devolution of power to local 
authorities, central authorities must not be left to simply set the rules of management or to 
judge the abilities of the local authority. While local authorities remain accountable to the 
central authority, the inverse must also be true. Central authorities must also be held 
accountable to local communities and organizations in order for trust to be built on both 
sides.
The objectives may differ greatly with devolution. With the empowerment of 
local communities, predefined priorities of the central authority may be rearranged. The 
Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in 
Zimbabwe is one example where devolution to the local level led to a re-arranging of 
priorities. CAMPFIRE'S concern with resource tenure was linked to broader issues of 
representation, economic participation, communal area governance and collective
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decision-making rather than solely issues of sustainable use of wildlife (Metcalfe, 1994). 
With CAMPFIRE, the empowerment of local communities was considered a precondition 
to wildlife conservation. The rearranging of the centrally held assumption that 
conservation may lead to local development was changed to local development that may 
help wildlife conservation.
Many criticisms of devolution result out of challenges to the assumptions that: 1) 
local residents are skilled in sustainable resource use and conservation,
2) contemporary rural communities are homogenous and stable, and,
3) local, community-based tenurial, knowledge and management systems are uniquely 
suitable for conservation (Enters and Anderson, 1999). While these assumptions may or 
may not hold true (or even be important), they cannot be used as excuses to prevent 
devolution to the local level, especially when current resource management approaches 
are not working. The real problem behind these assumptions is based on the lack of 
control by central authorities. Once again, trust is an important issue, and in many 
instances, devolution does not occur because of the perceived (or real) lack of the capacity 
for local institutions to undertake effective management. Meaningful devolution requires 
both that local-level managers (either local government or local communities) have the 
capacity for resource management and that those with the current authority to make 
management decisions be prepared to transfer that authority (Fisher, 1999). Levels of 
trust in local management must be built through building local capacities and providing 
examples of effective local management to demonstrate improved local capacities (Fisher, 
1999).
Community management o f resources is even further along the continuum of 
participation than devolution and it also involves many aspects of decentralization. It has
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been discussed widely as an ultimate ideal, although actual working examples o f complete 
community management are few (Fisher, 1999). While local residents have been making 
decisions for centuries regarding who may take resources, how, when and where those 
resources may be used, it has only been recently that such local management 
arrangements have been recognized by national or Western management authorities 
(Johannes, 1998).
Community-based conservation directly involves the integration of rural 
development and conservation. It can be defined as "local, voluntary initiatives involving 
a minimum of several households in which at least one of the outcomes of local 
management practices is either the maintenance of habitats, the preservation of species, or 
the conservation of certain critical resources and another outcome is the improvement of 
social and economic welfare (Little, 1994, p. 348)." There exist many different methods 
by which local initiatives are integrated into conservation and development schemes.
Community resource management has been described as a management 
framework that is based on community development through multiple uses of resources, 
where community forces drive land- and resource-use decisions, and where the 
community is satisHed with its involvement and benefits from the use of surrounding land 
and resources (Little, 1994).
One area of community-based resource management for which there exist 
numerous examples in the literature is common property resource (CPR) management 
systems. Berkes (1989), Ostrom (1990) and Bromley (1992) provide various examples of 
differing resources that are managed based on community knowledge about the resource 
and community customs and traditions that govern resource use.
Many of the problems associated with devolution are also present with
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community-based conservation, such as lack of faith in community management 
capacities. Due to the global nature of the environment and the increasing number of 
international environmental agreements, it is difficult for community-based conservation 
to exist in isolation. There are increasing pressures from governments and international 
organizations to meet global conservation standards. However, there is much support for 
the belief that community-based management systems provide a modem management 
alternative by ensuring equitable access and by managing and enforcing conservation 
measures to ensure sustainability (Ruddle, 1998).
In the area of fisheries management in particular, effective management of small- 
scale, near-shore fisheries using conventional Western methods has failed (Johannes,
1998). With the recognition of this fact, governments have begun to look towards 
community-based fisheries management's ability to meet government conservation 
standards (Johannes, 1998).
The main problem with community-based resource management is the difficulty 
encountered with the integration of govemment control. When govemment resource 
management initiatives are introduced, community customs are eroded, which decreases 
and illegitimizes the community resource management system. In an example from 
Indonesian fisheries, centralized conservation policies, combined with collusion and self- 
interest have combined to threaten both resources and the community resource institutions 
that have sustained resources over centuries (Thorbum, 2000).
In order to overcome such problems, a resource management arrangement is 
needed that is able to balance the needs of govemment authorities with those of local 
resource users. What is needed is a genuine sharing of power over the management of the 
resource, in decision-making, planning and implementation. Co-management is one such
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approach that attempts to incorporate elements of ICDPs, decentralization, devolution and 
community-based approaches into a partnership where governments and local 
communities share authority and responsibility for resource management (Pinkerton, 
1989). In the next chapter, co-management will be examined further with regard to how it 
allows for the integration of development and conservation with the full participation of 
local communities.
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Chapter 3 
Co-Management
As previously discussed, ICDPs, decentralization, devolution and community- 
based management are all genuine attempts at integrating conservation and development 
at the local level. However, conflicts continue to arise over local development and 
resource management issues. Conflicts arise because local communities feel as though 
they are excluded from conservation and development activities (govemment control and 
decentralization) or because govemment resource managers feel as if national 
conservation and development objectives are threatened (community-based management). 
The above approaches have been unable to achieve the necessary balance between 
stakeholder involvement, national conservation and development objectives and local 
conservation and development objectives.
Co-management is a further approach that attempts to combine elements from the 
above approaches to generate a management regime that is more suitable to all parties. In 
this chapter, co-management will be deflned and it will be discussed on the basis of how 
it addresses the key problems in integrating conservation and development at the local 
level. There are three key issues that will be dealt with: I) how the differing values and 
objectives of conservation and development are addressed, 2) how local participation and 
empowerment are included, and 3) how common property resource (CPR) management 
systems are included. These three issues form the basis of the main questions of the 
thesis: I) the effectiveness of co-management at integrating conservation and 
development, 2) the ability for co-management to allow greater local participation, and 3) 
the ability of co-management to allow for the integration of conventional, state-led
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environmental management with local CPR management systems.
3.1 Co-management Definitions and Examples:
Decentralization, devolution and community-based resource management have all 
been shown to exist on a continuum of community participation. Co-management is an 
approach that uses various elements from the above approaches in an attempt to generate 
a more suitable management arrangement capable of recognizing differing management 
cultures. Co-management is a term that is widely used in resource management, yet it is 
not precisely defined in the literature. It has been defined as a "process of shared decision 
making between decision-makers and resident shareholders who seek to optimize mutual 
good and to plan for the long term" (Reed, 1995, p. 133). Such a definition places the 
emphasis on the participation of local resource users in state-led management. It is 
important to recognize that within this defînition, a distinction is made between the 
decision makers (i.e. govemment) and resident stakeholders (i.e. local people). The 
degree to which decision making powers are actually shared between these two groups 
depends on the agreement made (formal or informal) and the particular situation.
Co-management can be more broadly defîned as various levels of integration of 
local- and state-level management systems (Berkes et al., 1991; Pinkerton, 1992; Notzke, 
1995). Integration is the key element that allows for the combination of various 
techniques, values and approaches in order to achieve management objectives. This more 
broad definition incorporates not only the elements of participation, but also the 
integration of different management systems. It is unnecessary to precisely define co­
management because of the wide range of management schemes that fall under the co­
management framework, and examples o f co-management exist that cover broad ranges 
of participation and integration. For the purposes of this thesis, co-management can be
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defined as an arrangement where decision-making powers are shared between government 
and local resource users which allows for the integration of different objectives, values 
and approaches to resource management.
Co-management allows for the sharing of decision making powers between groups 
that may have different styles of resource management, such as the state/bureaucratic style 
and common property resource management style (Beckley, 1998). That is why a precise 
definition of co-management is difficult. In fact, a continuum of co-management 
agreements exist, ranging from arrangements where local people are merely consulted to 
those where local populations have all of the management power and responsibility 
(Berkesetal., 1991).
There are numerous examples of co-management agreements, both in Canada and 
internationally that have achieved varying degrees of success. In Canada, co-management 
has been used to manage resources jointly between government and Aboriginal groups 
(Royal Commission on Aboriginal People, 1996). Probably the most well known 
international co-management agreements are found in Australia, where much has been 
written about the co-management agreements between Aboriginal people and the 
government to manage national parks (De Lacy, 1993; Davis and Weiller, 1992; 
Richardson 1992). Co-management agreements also exist for the management of forest 
reserves in Zaire (Matose, 1997; Bruce et al., 1993), India (Corbridge and Jewitt, 1997) 
and in Samoa (Cox and Elmqvist, 1997), among others.
Co-management has been developed as a potential method to integrate common 
property resource management practices with those that are state-controlled. By creating 
a partnership where authority and responsibility for resource management is shared 
between local and state management systems, it is more likely for common property
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resource institutions to remain intact in the face of government control and integration 
into capitalist systems of production and trade (Thorbum, 2000).
Co-management agreements have evolved into a method to deal with the above 
mentioned conflicts in environmental management. Since the goals and values of state 
resource departments and those of local groups are often quite different, the framework of 
co-management can allow for the incorporation of both sets of values into the 
management of the resource. When diverse groups are included in co-management 
process, they are able to articulate their diverse values.
Government agencies based their policies on traditional western notions of 
conservation. These policies, based on the view of nature as "an untouched and 
untouchable wilderness", ignored the "historical relationship between people and their 
habitats and the role people play in maintaining biodiversity in forests and savannas" 
(McNeely in Cox and Elmqvist, 1997, p. 85). In many developing countries, rural 
inhabitants view the land and the resources as communal property that can neither be 
individually owned, nor traded, as in the case with private or government-owned land. A 
major feature in many rural resource systems is communal control of the resource. Co­
management allows for sharing of control over common property resources between 
government and local users. Enforcement of norms, rules and regulations must be based 
on a community value system that is agreed upon by all of the group members and 
government (Berkes et al., 1991).
One of the most important reasons for co-management is to provide a means for 
different stakeholders with conflicting values to share a resource and participate in its 
management (Notzke, 1995). By agreeing to a management system that allows for joint- 
use of a resource, it is likely that conflicts will be reduced. If members of all the
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stakeholder groups can agree upon and coordinate a management scheme, there is greater 
potential for sustainable use of the resource. Co-management allows for bilateral and 
multilateral agreements between local residents, government officials and non­
government organizations so that conflicts can be resolved while maintaining sound 
environmental management. With co-management, local bodies can make locally 
appropriate decisions and reduce state/local conflicts that result from state decisions that 
are made thousands of kilometres away (Pinkerton, 1996). The assumption is that local 
bodies have greater flexibility to design appropriate local regulations and offer a greater 
chance of compliance than state regulations that originate at a distance (both physically 
and by way of understanding local conditions). However, in order for the assumption to 
hold, local bodies must have the authority, power and competence to do so.
Enforcement is also most likely to succeed if such activities are shared between 
the state and local users (Hawkes, 1996). In theory, the possibility of voluntary 
compliance increases because local resource users have a say in how the resource is 
managed. Local management bodies, run by local citizens, also have a vested interest in 
the sustainable use of resources and therefore, are more considerate of the long term 
benefits of resource management (Pinkerton, 1996). Local resource users have the benefit 
o f participating in decisions that affect their access to resources while government 
managers have the benefit of greater acceptance and compliance with government 
regulations (Berkes, 1994).
Based on the above definition and experiences, co-management has the potential 
to be used as an effective tool in overcoming conflicts with local development and 
conservation. Co-management has the potential for linking conservation with local 
development, for increasing local participation, for integrating common property resource
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management systems and for the integration of local social, economic and environmental 
objectives.
3.2 Problems That Co-Management Must Address
Co-management provides a potential approach to integrating conservation and 
development with the involvement of local people. It allows for conflicts that result out 
of conflicting views to be resolved by integrating local resource management techniques, 
values and customs with those of government-led conservation.
Based on the above discussion of co-management, there are a number of aspects 
that must be considered when examining a particular co-management agreement. It has 
been suggested that in order for conservation to be successful at the local level, it must be 
linked with a development component. Economic incentives must be generated for 
conservation that promote sustainable use of resources, social health and cultural 
sustainability.
Another important aspect is local participation. Local participation refers to the 
degree to which local people are empowered to make conservation and development 
decisions, the stages at which decisions are made (planning, design and implementation) 
and the manner in which participation is sustained through local institution building. 
When these three aspects are combined, can co-management be effective at integrating 
conservation and development?
A fînal aspect that must be considered with co-management is common property 
resource management systems. In order for co-management to be successful, existing 
traditional and local strategies for the environment, economy and society must be 
considered. These strategies need to be integrated into any new management arrangement 
that includes local values with government values.
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Therefore, by examining the integration of conservation and development 
initiatives, local participation, and local common property resource management systems, 
the appropriateness of co-management arrangements can be analyzed.
3.3 Importance of Linking Conservation and Development
Conservation is of secondary importance to most rural inhabitants in the Third 
World. While there are numerous linkages between rural livelihoods and the 
environment, the primary concern for rural residents is to create conditions in which they 
can satisfy their basic needs for survival (Hackel, 1993). The satisfaction of such needs 
deals primarily with the alleviation o f poverty and, therefore, is often the focus of 
development projects. Rural residents generally view conservation as a worthwhile goal 
yet they believe that it should not take precedence over people (Hackel, 1993). Wells and 
Brandon (1992) describe successful cases of rural resource management that meet two 
objectives: to increase the income of individuals through access to the resources, and to 
conserve the resource base. They include projects associated with tourism revenue 
development in Amboseli National Park in Kenya, collection of non-timber resources in 
Royal Chitwan National Park in Nepal, and local income- generating activities such as 
agroforestry, reforestation and ecotourism in the Osa Peninsula, Costa Rica (Wells and 
Brandon, 1992). Such an approach demonstrates the importance of dealing with issues of 
social security as well as dealing with resource management or conservation issues.
Many rural communities in the developing world either maintain subsistence- 
based agricultural systems or are dependent on the natural resource base as their primary 
source of income. For them, employment offers an increase in security or a cushion for 
the inevitable instances where agriculture fails due to natural phenomena such as drought 
or disease. Therefore, rural populations view employment opportunities as much more
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important than conservation (Hackel, 1993). The difficult dilemma of economic 
development over conservation is common in most poor rural areas and poses difficult 
problems for conservationists. Unless local populations see themselves as deriving direct 
benefits from conservation, it is unlikely that they will take measures or be enthusiastic 
about actions in that direction (especially if conservation limits their access to resources).
Therefore, successful conservation projects must involve an integration of rural 
economic development and conservation. Unless projects generate higher revenues 
through economic opportunities, higher yields for sustainable practices than unsustainable 
ones, and resource based activities that remain in the hands of local people, sustainable 
development will not be profitable and conservation efforts will be bound to fail (Viet et 
al., 1995). These issues deal primarily with measures that would alleviate poverty. By 
increasing revenues generated at the local level, economic incentives can be created that 
do not necessarily involve environmentally destructive behaviour. However, sustainable 
rural development is bound to fail if greater benefits can be obtained by unsustainable 
practices. Social conditions must be improved and the linkage between increasing 
economic welfare, local participation and conservation must be demonstrated for any 
conservation effort to be achieved.
The time frame over which profits from conservation and development are 
generated Is also important. When the economic situation is precarious, people are more 
likely to support projects that generate revenues in the shortest time period, regardless of 
long term consequences. They do not have the flexibility to make investments in the 
future. For example, leaving valuable timber in a forest increases the value of the timber 
over time, however, that fact is not o f concern to someone who needs to capitalize on that 
value in the present (Feamside, 1999).
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Ideally, the co-management framework (through local participation in all 
activities) provides opportunities to generate economic incentives for local people in a 
sustainable manner. The Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous 
Resources (CAMPFIRE) in Zimbabwe is an example of a co-management arrangement 
where authority, management, production and benefit are all primarily situated with the 
local producer community (Metcalfe, 1994). The Gwaii Haanas Agreement in Canada 
allows for local community development and livelihood security in conjunction with 
national park management (Hawkes, 1996). Co-management can promote ecologically 
sustainable use of the environment, social health and cultural sustainability of the local 
population and direct economic benefits (Berkes et al., 1991). It can, therefore, 
effectively link conservation to local development by allowing for participation of both 
resource managers and local communities.
3.4 Importance of Local Participation
One of the key elements of integrating conservation and development is the 
involvement of local people. Local participation is now seen as one of the most important 
ingredients that allows for the successful implementation of integrated conservation and 
development projects (Wells and Brandon, 1992). Effort to increase local participation in 
conservation and development has arisen out of the problems encountered with highly 
centralized and non-paiticipatory programs of the past (Little, 1994). Therefore, if the co­
management approach is to be used, an examination of the importance of local 
participation and the potential for co-management to create opportunities for local 
participation must be included. This section discusses the importance of local 
participation and how co-management provides opportunities for greater local 
participation.
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Any examination of participation must include an examination of the degree of 
local involvement, the stages at which participation occurs and how local participation is 
linked to the sustainability of programs. These factors are all significant in influencing 
the success of integrating conservation and development programs, and co-management 
provides the opportunity to address them. Without local participation, the potential exists 
for greater conflict between local people and conservation managers regarding desired 
goals, values and desired outcomes.
The various degrees to which local participation occurs are best illustrated the 
typology of citizen participation developed by Amstein (1969) and adapted by Berkes et 
al. (1991) and Matose (1997) for co-management of resources (Table 1). In this diagram, 
the levels of participation range from non-participation to full participation. Participation 
refers to the means to which "have-nots" join in determining how information is shared, 
goals and policies are set, programs are operated and benefits distributed (Amstein, 1969). 
Local participation is measured in this method by degrees of authority or power that local 
people have and it refers to the means by which they can influence change. Depending on 
the co-management arrangement, the level of local participation can fall anywhere on the 
ladder, which reflects the variability of different arrangements to generate genuine 
participation. Greater local participation in co-management may or may not result in 
more efficient management of the resource but it will certainly be more compatible with 
local needs (Berkes et al., 1991). It is insufficient to examine participation by itself, the 
examination must also include how people participate and what authority their 
participation includes.
By examining the authority vested in local people, the element of empowerment is 
introduced. Empowerment refers to the ability of one group to make institutions
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responsive to their views, aspirations and needs (Amstein, 1969). In the context of 
resource management, empowerment has been defined as the ability of local communities 
to have control over and shared benefits of local resource initiatives (Scheyrens, 1999). 
Regarding participation without including an examination of empowerment misses the 
point because there are many instances where people have participated a great deal in a 
project but they have no real power in what goes on. Co-management arrangements can 
involve the full delegation of real decision-making power to local people (Hawkes, 1996), 
thereby empowering local communities.
Another important aspect of local participation in need of consideration is the area 
in which local involvement occurs. Ideally, local participation would occur throughout, 
however, this is rarely the case. Kiss (1990) identifîes three areas where local 
participation is particularly important; participation in benefits, participation in planning 
and design and participation in implementation and management. Local participation in 
benefits is important because it is necessary to obtain local support for conservation and 
to compensate for the potential costs of conservation such as the loss of access to 
resources or the limiting of activities. The benefits may be direct, such as increases in 
income, or indirect, such as improved sanitation or nutrition, but the benefits must be 
directly linked to the conservation objectives (Kiss, 1990). There are numerous examples 
where local participation in benefits from conservation is enhanced through co­
management arrangements. Local communities have participated in benefits through 
tourism (Prystupa, 1998), wildlife management (Metcalfe, 1994) and park management 
(Notzke, 1995).
Local participation in planning and design is also important. Involving local 
populations at the beginning of a project allows for local views and perceptions, needs.
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traditions, constraints and expectations of the resources in question to be included. If this 
occurs, it is more likely that desired benefits to local populations will be obtained and 
therefore, conservation will be successful. Finally, it is important to include local 
participation in the implementation and management of the project.
The implementation of conservation projects requires organizational, technical 
and managerial elements. In order for conservation projects to remain sustainable over 
the long term, local participation must be included in all of these aspects (Little, 1994). 
There are many instances where projects run smoothly through the implementation phase, 
yet it becomes unlikely that project activities will continue because of over reliance on 
donor funding or field staff (Wells and Brandon, 1992). In order for this to be avoided, 
many conservation and development projects involve a training aspect in which local 
residents are able to acquire technical, managerial and organizational skills. One example 
of such a case is in Kakadu National Park in Australia, where a co-management 
agreement outlines the obligation to train local Aboriginals in skills necessary for them to 
participate in park management. Local members of the various Aborigines communities 
that comprise the Gagudju Association were involved in an Aboriginal ranger training 
program that involved local residents in conceiving, planning and implementation of 
management techniques (Hill, 1983).
Local participation can be seen as both a goal and as a means of achieving goals 
(Little, 1994). Participation allows communities to have greater control over resources 
and decisions that directly affect their lives. It also provides a means to achieve social 
and economic objectives. It is for these reasons that local involvement in resource 
conservation is a primary objective of current conservation movements. The most 
important area in which local involvement is sought is in the area of determining goals
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(Uphoff et al., 1998). Unless resource management goals match those of the local 
resource users, constant conflict will result. The determination of goals hinges on the 
aspect of participation in decision making. Local people can only have their objectives 
heard and considered if they are a part of the decision making process.
Closely associated with decision making power is local empowerment. The ability 
to make locally specific decisions with regards to the environment, society and the 
economy is important. It includes the ability to resist the infringement of others onto 
economic or cultural interests that are valued by the individual or community and the 
ability to promote those interests in which others are willing to accept (Uphoff et al.,
1998). This allows local interests to influence resource management regulations and the 
planning process.
In order for conservation and development projects to remain sustainable over the 
long term, all o f the elements of local participation must be maintained (Little, 1994). 
Local level participation must be promoted from the beginning in the design, 
implementation and management of projects at the local level. There are two ways in 
which organization for continued participation can be achieved. The first involves the use 
of agents of change, who are described as field workers or extension workers that are 
employed for implementation of the project and for mobilizing the community around the 
project (Wells and Brandon, 1992). This approach achieves results quickly, however, 
there is no organizational structure to support the project activities once the agents of 
change are removed unless some sort of local structure that existed previously is able to 
take over.
The second approach for organizing for local participation involves the 
recognition or creation of local institutions. The Nyaminyami Wildlife Management
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Trust in Zimbabwe, is one example where a local institution was created with aid from 
local residents, local government and the national government parks department, with the 
specific goal of participating in conservation and development projects (Metcalfe, 1994).
In another example from Suriname, the Foundation for Nature Conservation Alusiaka 
(STIDUNAL) arose in a time of civil conflict and it was subsequently used for 
participation in conservation and development at the village level. Either way, institution 
building has been argued as more effective in sustaining local participation than relying 
on individual agents of change (Wells and Brandon, 1992).
Institution building has been defined as "the creation of procedures for democratic 
decision making at the local level and the involvement of local people in these procedures 
to the extent that they regard them as the normal way of conducting community affairs 
(Midgely in Wells and Brandon, 1992: 82)." With the use of local institutions, project 
activities are incorporated into the manner in which the community functions. Project 
decisions are not seen by the community to be authoritatively imposed by outsiders and 
enforcement is more likely. Once project activities become part of the community, they 
are likely to be self-sustaining when funding for the project inevitably runs out. While the 
local institution building approach is much more time consuming than the use of agents of 
change, the potential for greater benefits over the long term exists.
From the literature on local participation it is evident that numerous aspects are 
important. Successful community based conservation and development projects must 
have high degrees of local participation. This participation refers not only to the depth of 
participation but also to the breadth of the community that participates. The stages at 
which participation occurs is another critical element. Successful local participation 
programs involve local residents at all levels of the planning, implementation and
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managing stages. Participation is also important as both a goal and as a means of 
achieving goals. It allows for specific goals to be achieved, goals that are often simply for 
empowerment, or being able to control the conditions which affect day to day life.
Finally, it is important to obtain sustained participation. Sustained participation can only 
be achieved if local institution building is incorporated into project activities so that they 
become a part of community activity.
3.5 Importance of Common Property Resource Management
Most rural communities in the developing world base their economies on 
subsistence agriculture or the use of natural resources, to varying degrees. Such activities 
involve the joint use of communal property in which many families share resources.
There exists a wide range of common property resource systems that vary greatly in the 
resources that are used, the manner in which resource decisions are made and how the 
management of the resource is maintained. Therefore, in many situations, co­
management arrangements will need to consider the reasons for common property 
resource systems, the types of resources that are managed communally, the way that these 
elements affect the manner in which local resource decisions are made and the way that 
resources are traditionally managed.
Hardin (1968) described, in a simplified manner, the "tragedy of the commons” 
using an example of grazing land. Without privatization or government control, the 
resource is expected to become depleted because users receive individual benefîts with 
over-exploitation, while the costs are shared with all other users. The limitations to this 
theory have been often cited (Burger and Gochfeld, 1998; Feeny et al., 1990). The major 
criticism of the "tragedy of the commons" is that its impeccable logic applies to few actual 
cases, of which Western European communal property systems are one such case.
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Stevenson (1991) defines common property resources as "a form of resource 
management in which a well-delineated group of competing users participate in the 
extraction or use of a jointly held, fugitive resource according to explicitly or implicitly 
understood rules about who may take how much of the resource (p. 46)." Essentially, the 
number of users is limited to those who are members of the defined group, each user has 
knowledge about their rights and limits, and decisions are made as a group process. 
Common property resources are an example of resources that are managed directly by 
local groups.
There are two main concepts that can be derived out of Stevenson's (1991) 
definition. The first concept refers to the physical and environmental aspects of the 
resource and the human pressures placed upon it. The second concept refers to the rules 
governing the use of the resource. The rules that govern use are an indication of 
management decisions that are made to control access to, or use of, the resource. A 
relationship exists between physical aspects of common property resources (such as 
resource scarcity) and the level to which communal resource management decisions are 
institutionalized.
The physical and environmental aspects of the resource are of little consequence in 
this discussion about resource management. It is the way that resource decisions are 
made, who makes them and how those decisions are made that is of interest. The main 
point that must be made is that the resource in question is indeed a common property 
resource (or was prior to conservation intervention) and that a management system is 
necessary.
Common property resource management systems have been identified as a 
potential area for development assistance for the rural poor. CPR management systems
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are seen as providing a more equitable distribution of the benefits of resource exploitation 
through the controlled extraction of local resources for local benefit (Thorbum, 2(XX)). 
Common property resource management systems are also an area of great interest for 
conservation. The emphasis that has been placed on participatory development and the 
potential benefits of common property resource strategies suggest that there is a need for 
examination of the relationships between the environment, the economy, social systems 
and resource management systems because of participatory developments broad scope 
(Jodha, 1992). There is a need to integrate such systems within Western notions of 
resource management in order to avoid conflicting views on the way resources are used.
Before development initiatives are implemented where CPR management systems 
exist, the impacts of external involvement (through regulation) on resource management 
systems should be considered. The implementation of overly strong, centralized 
institutions has the effect of eroding existing local institutions (formal and informal) and 
further degrading the resource (Jodha, 1992). However, if the management system does 
not have a strong institutional base, resource degradation may also occur. A fine balance 
exists between the organization of society around a resource system and the successful 
management of the resource (Jodha, 1992). Therefore, there is a need for some type of 
management regime, where genuine power sharing allows for the integration of 
communal property systems with those of the state, such as co-management (Sekhar, 
2000).
Runge (1992) describes three main factors that lead to common property resource 
management systems: poverty, dependence on natural resources and uncertainty. Poverty 
limits the opportunities for individuals to take advantage of privatized resources. The act 
of creating the institutions for private property is very expensive. It is expensive to survey
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land, to have courts that respect land titles and monitor for compliance of obedience to 
private property rules. Moreover, local beliefs or customs may not recognize property 
rights in the Western sense, but recognize the right for all to use the land and its resources 
(Berkes, 1994). For those individuals who live on a subsistence level, communal use is a 
necessity and a way of life.
The dependence on natural resources is another factor that leads to the 
development of common property resource management. The distribution of natural 
resources and the natural phenomena upon which they are dependent occurs in a random 
pattern over the landscape. Such conditions make it extremely difficult to assign 
exclusive use rights to a certain area equitably. Common property institutions tend to 
reduce the environmental uncertainty faced by resource users (Runge, 1992).
Uncertainty is the final factor that leads to communal management of resources 
and it is a direct result of the previous two factors. Where poverty exists, the options 
available for subsistence are limited to the use of the natural resources in the surrounding 
area. When entire livelihoods are based on resources that are affected by the randomness 
of the environment or require collective effort (i.e., rice fields and irrigation agriculture), 
people tend to coalesce into groups. Communal management allows users to share in the 
benefits of resources and to distribute the losses equitably. Such behaviour is a hedge 
against uncertainty, where, instead of acting like rational individuals, people will accept 
less than a best case scenario in order to avoid a worst case scenario (Runge, 1992). The 
solution for the management of common property resources is to place the property rights 
of the resource in the hands of certain users. Common property resource (CPR) 
management does this within the framework o f group control.
Other important considerations with common property resources are the t>pes of
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resources and conditions under which they can be managed through group control. There 
are many examples of common property resource management systems that cover many 
different resources, such as water, forests, wildlife, Hsheries and grazing lands (Cousins, 
1996). Common property resource institutions rely on local beliefs and customs to 
provide the various rules and conventions regulating the use of these resources (Sekhar, 
2000).
Common property resource (CPR) management systems have been successful in 
managing natural resources and protecting biodiversity in numerous situations (Berkes, 
1989; Ostrom, 1990; Bromley, 1992). However, increasing pressures on resources 
through the extraction of raw materials, expanding modification of the environment and 
the erosion of traditional values and norms has led to the intervention of the state in the 
management of CPRs.
In many cases, CPR systems have become impractical as a result of new 
challenges from a more integrated society where communal values are not as strong. This 
has resulted in attempts at state control where further degradation to the resource has 
often occurred due to the failure of the state to consider local management approaches and 
policies (Sekhar, 2(KX)). Both of these issues suggest the need for a type of management 
regime that allows for the sharing of decision-making powers between communal 
property resource management systems and state control (Pinkerton, 1994). In Indonesia, 
the local management of marine resources provides an excellent example of a CPR 
management institution where both the resource and the institution have been threatened 
by centrally-imposed state management techniques (Thorbum, 2(XX)). Attempts are now 
being made to use a mutually beneficial co-management regime that could serve the 
interests and employ the inherent knowledge o f local communities, resource users and
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government agents in Indonesia (Thorbum, 2000). Another example is of the Nunavut 
Wildlife Management Board (NWMB) that uses both scientific knowledge and traditional 
Inuit knowledge in its co-management arrangement and addresses the diminishing 
communal values with state control of resources (Rodon, 1998).
While the management of resources communally has been successful in the past, 
the integration of state-led management should continue to include such approaches 
where they still exist through the use of co-management. Co-management has become 
increasingly significant in the contemporary world where local-level traditional controls 
to resource management alone are no longer sufficient as a result of increasing national 
and international pressures on resources (Berkes, 1989). In many instances, the 
integration of scientific knowledge with traditional knowledge has improved resource 
management systems. Therefore, co-management should include not only the sharing of 
decision-making responsibility and authority, but also the integration of different resource 
knowledge systems (Rodon, 1998).
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Chapter 4 
Methods
The co-management arrangement for the Galibi Nature Reserve was used as a case 
study to determine the ability of co-management: to address conflicting conservation and 
development issues, to increase local participation in resource management and to 
integrate state resource management systems with conunon property resource 
management systems. This chapter will outline the methods by which the information for 
the Galibi case study was collected. It will begin with a description of the study area, 
followed by the rationale for the case study approach, the theoretical propositions that 
guide the research and finally will conclude with the data sources, scope and limitations.
4.1 Study Area
Suriname is located in tropical South America, on the North-East coast between 
French Guiana and Guyana (see Figure I). Formerly a Dutch colony, this relatively small, 
sparsely inhabited country gained its independence in 1975. Of the approximately 
425,(XX) inhabitants, 70% are concentrated in and around the capital city of Paramaribo, 
25% in small towns along the coastal plain and 5% in the Savanna belt and the interior 
along the Marowijne, the Suriname and Saramacca rivers. With such population 
concentration in the city, the remaining 90% of the country has a very low population 
density.
The majority of the country is covered by a vast expanse of tropical rainforest and 
is largely untouched by humans. While lowland tropical rainforest makes up nearly 90% 
of the landmass, there exists great diversity ranging from swamps and mangrove forests in 
the coastal region, to forested highlands along the Guyana Shield with forested and
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Figure 1: Map of Study Area
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swamp savannas interspersed throughout (Baal, 1999). These various ecological areas are 
intersected by numerous rivers.
As can be expected with the diversity in landforms, both flora and fauna species 
diversity is great. It has been estimated that there exist 138 unique tree species in the 
lowland forest portion of the Guyana Shield alone and the overall level of plant endemism 
is estimated at 40% (Conservation International and Government of Suriname, 2000).
The peoples of Suriname are very diverse as well. There are numerous ethnic 
groups that inhabit the capital and coastal towns, however, in the more isolated regions of 
the interior, the population consists mostly of Amerindian or Maroon communities 
(approximately 12% of the total population). Such communities range from those that are 
completely isolated and rely solely on hunting, fishing, shifting agriculture and non­
timber forest products to those that are well integrated into the national wage economy.
The specific study area includes the Carib villages of Christiaankondre and 
Langamankondre, and the Galibi Nature Reserve (see Figure I). These two traditional 
Amerindian villages comprise approximately KXM) inhabitants who use the surrounding 
area for subsistence activities such as hunting. Ashing, agriculture and gathering of timber 
and non-timber resources.
Traditional tribal societies have faced radical change since the 1980s, much of it 
brought about by the expansion of logging, mining and other natural resource exploitation 
in the interior, bringing the government into conflict with the indigenous tribal 
communiAes. Between 1986 and 1992, the Government o f Suriname and the tribal 
communities of the interior were in a state of civil war. Rapid expansion into the interior 
without recognition of traditional land rights was one of the main causes of the conflict. 
The conflict illustrated the degree to which various groups felt threatened by the
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expansion of forestry and mining concessions in the interior. The peace accord that was 
signed in 1992 recognized the right of citizens of tribal communities to secure communal 
land title and the right to pursue economic activities in an economic zone surrounding 
those communities. However, the agreement has yet to be implemented, economic 
development in the interior proceeds in an ad hoc manner, and traditional land rights have 
yet to be formally implemented. Therefore, trust between local communities and 
government is an important issue.
4.2 Rationale for Use of Case Study:
The method that is used in any study is dependent on the questions that are asked 
and the conditions under which such questions are asked. The case study approach was 
considered in this study because it represents the best method for guiding contemporary 
questions in which there is very little control over behaviourial events (Yin, 1989). The 
case study allows for the detailed examination of a particular situation that can then be 
used to examine general theoretical problems. The case study approach is also flexible in 
nature so that the research can respond to evolving events.
Critiques of the case study approach are commonly based on the lack of rigour or 
bias of the researcher, the difficulty in maintaining external validity and that such an 
approach is too time consuming. These problems can be addressed with a rigorous 
research design and a well organized approach to research.
The research began with an extensive review of co-management, conservation, 
development and common property resources in the literature to identify research 
questions which served to anchor the case study research. Canadian Crossroads 
International provided the opportunity for obtaining volunteer work experience in 
Suriname. Through contacts with work placement at the Association of Indigenous
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Leaders of Suriname, the efforts for conservation and development at the Galibi Nature 
Reserve became evident and were the impetus for the case study location.
Since the focus of the case study research was on the ability of the co-management 
arrangement for the Galibi Nature Reserve to integrate conservation and development 
through the involvement of local people, reliance on qualitative data was necessary.
While it would have been possible to quantify reaction of individual village residents to 
the co-management arrangement through a close-ended questionnaire, it was felt that this 
would not provide an accurate picture of the situation. By allowing interviewees to frame 
the problems, solutions and responses through open-ended questions, the research was 
able to proceed beyond the rigid structures of quantitative data based on questionnaires.
External validity is a common concern with case study research. External validity 
was addressed in this study through a thorough literature review prior to beginning the 
study that provided the background that enabled similarities and differences to be 
identified which could then be generalized to the wider field of conservation and 
development. Attempts were made to corroborate all information through the use of 
various sources of information.
4.3 Key Theoretical Propositions
Based on the literature review, three key theoretical propositions were examined 
that were deemed to be essential for co-management of the Galibi Nature Reserve and 
they have already been described in previous sections (Chapter 1 and Chapter 3). A 
feminist framework for participatory development provides the rationale for the inclusion 
of local people in development and conservation. It focuses on micro-level decisions, 
highlighting of complexities, differentiation between strategic and practical needs and a 
shift from welfare to empowerment. The discussion on co-management focused on the
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issues of linking conservation and development, local participation and local common 
property resource systems which follow the suggestions from feminist development 
literature. These two sections can be combined to create three key theoretical 
propositions and they are as follows: 1) in order for conservation to be achieved it must 
be linked to local, micro-level development activities, 2) local people must be able to 
participate and have the authority and power to participate in the decision-making, 
implementation and management processes (which is a shift from a welfare to 
empowerment), and 3) common property resource management systems must be 
integrated with state management systems (which highlight the complexities of local 
resource management). The co-management agreement that exists for Galibi Nature 
Reserve for the conservation of marine turtles is examined below with regard to these 
propositions.
4.4 Data Sources, Scope and Limitations
Data sources for the case study included both written material (such as 
government and NGO documents), interviews with key informants and observations. The 
written documents provided crucial background information and detailed the manner in 
which environmental management proceeds in Suriname from the govemment/NGO 
perspective. The documents provided the legislation, mandates and regulations that 
demonstrated the way things were intended and provided contrast to what was actually 
occurring. Information at the local level relied more on interviews and observations and 
provided the material needed to determine what was occuring at the local level.
Interviews were conducted during the months of May through August 2000, and 
involved members of government, environmental NGOs, village leaders from 
Langamankondre and Christiaankondre, and tour operators involved in the conservation
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of marine turtles in and around Galibi Nature Reserve as well as related tourism ventures. 
Many of the interviews at the local level relied on the use of translators. Two reliable 
translators were used who were both well recognized and respected in the villages of 
Christiaankondre and Langamankondre. The interviews always included some basic 
questions and followed a general framework (see Appendix 1) but were informal in style. 
Rather than adhering to a standardized survey-style format, the unstructured approached 
allowed the interview to pursue unanticipated issues and questions. The specific 
questions varied with regard to how the interviewee was involved in Galibi Nature 
Reserve, but generally dealt with how the stakeholder or interest group they represented 
was involved (goals, activities and degree of involvement) in conservation and 
development in Galibi. Detailed notes were kept of all questions asked and of all 
responses and respondents understood the purpose of the research and were assured of 
anonymity.
Written sources, interviews and observations were combined to provide a clearer 
picture of the potential barriers and incentives to the development of a co-management 
approach for conservation and development in Galibi. The data was summarized based 
on the source of the information and how it fit with the case study protocol framework 
that provided the guiding questions for interviews.
The scope of the research was an examination of the management arrangements 
for the Galibi Nature Reserve. The focus included the various interactions at the local, 
national and international level that influenced how management of the nature reserve 
proceeded. While it was important to understand the context under which conservation 
and development proceeded, the main conservation goal o f the Galibi nature reserve was 
the conservation of marine turtles while the main source of development was through
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ecotourism development.
Two resource limitations that were encountered were language barriers and available 
time. The official language of the country is Dutch, the majority o f the population speaks 
Surinamese, and in the villages of Christiaankondre and Langamankondre, the predominant 
language is Carib. There was, thus, significant reliance on translation in interviews, 
documents and of secondary sources. There was an attempt to use reliable translators, who 
were well informed of the research objectives and of the study community, to overcome the 
obstacles o f translation. As with any interview, bias on the part of the interviewee and the 
interviewer were introduced, but this was held to a minimum by corroborating evidence with 
multiple sources.
At the local level, there was reluctance to discuss anything about the specifics of the 
village way of life. This included any talk of specific tourism revenues from the arrangement 
with STINASU (the semi-government organization responsible for nature tourism). The 
reluctance was a result of previous experiences with ethnographic research in the village and 
it was necessary to stress that the focus o f this research was on the management of the Galibi 
Nature Reserve and not intrusive research regarding the village way o f life. It was also 
impossible to obtain specific revenues from STINASU, or the amount that was returned to 
the village for local development projects. Therefore, there was a gap in information 
regarding the frill impacts of tourism.
The length o f study was limited to the 4 month period of May to August, 2000, as a 
result o f the overseas placement with Canadian Crossroads International. In such a short 
period o f time, it was important to balance the need to gather as much information as possible 
with the concerns people might have over providing the information and building their trust
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Chapter 5 
Case Study of Galibi Nature Reserve
In this chapter, the Galibi Nature Reserve is examined. A brief discussion of 
marine turtle biology is included to provide an idea of the difficulties encountered in 
conservation. The process by which the Galibi Nature Reserve was created is discussed, 
the organizations involved at the national, international and local level are examined and 
the co-management arrangement for the Galibi Nature Reserve is described.
5.1 The Galibi Nature Reserve
The Galibi Nature Reserve is located in the North-East comer of Suriname where 
the Marowijne River meets the Atlantic ocean (see Figure I). The mixing o f the fresh 
water with the ocean and the large sand bars and sandy beaches makes it one of the most 
significant marine turtle nesting sites in the Western Atlantic (Reichart, 1992). The 4,000 
hectare reserve (4 km long by 1 km wide), contains the greatest biological diversity that 
can be found along the Suriname coast. While the entire Nature Reserve is protected 
under the 1954 Nature Preservation Law, its primary concern is to protect marine turtles 
and their nesting beaches. By creating the Galibi Nature Reserve in 1969, the government 
of Suriname made an important contribution to international marine turtle conservation 
efforts.
5.2 Marine Turtle Life History
There are four marine turtle species that use the Galibi beaches as nesting habitat, 
the olive ridley (Lepidochelys olivacea), green turtle {Chelonia my das), the leatherback 
{Dermochelys coriacea) and the hawksbill {Eretmochelys imbricata). They range in 
average size from 45 kg for an adult olive ridley to 900 kg for the leatherback (Meylan
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and Ehrenfeid, 2000). The various species exhibit similar life histories. The females of 
the species bury clutches of 100 eggs on coastal and estuarine beaches. The mature males 
and females gather off of the beaches to mate in the early part of the year and the females 
return to the beaches to lay between 1 and 10 clutches of eggs per year during the months 
of May through September (National Research Council, 1990). After nesting, the females 
return to the open ocean for a period of 1-4 years before mating again at the same site.
The turtle eggs are laid in a hole dug in the sand and they incubate for 
approximately 2 months. After the incubation period is over, the hatchlings dig their way 
to the surface and make their way to the water. The hatchlings spend their early years in 
the off-shore waters, feeding off the surface. The majority of the hatchlings activities 
during these years remain a mystery and are thus called their "lost years" (Meylan and 
Ehrenfeid, 2(KK)). After an unknown period of time, they reappear in the coastal zone, 
bays, river mouths and estuaries where they spend their juvenile life eating and growing 
until they reach maturity, which can take between 10 and SO years, depending on the 
species (National Research Council, 1990).
The life span of marine turtles ranges from 50 to 75 years or more. Such a long 
life span and a long period to reach maturity poses many difficulties in assessing the 
status of populations and conservation efforts (Meylan and Ehrenfeid, 2000). Adult 
marine turtles that are observed nesting today, hatched decades ago when conditions were 
quite different. Therefore, it is very difficult to determine the effects of egg harvesting on 
populations when adult females continue to return to nest for 50 years, which gives the 
impression that populations are stable. Meanwhile, populations may be progressively 
depleted of hatchling, juvenile and young adults (Meylan and Ehrenfeid, 2(XX)).
Marine turtle populations are difficult to estimate as a result of their cyclical
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nesting patterns in which they may spend 1-4 years in the open ocean (National Research 
Council, 1990). Estimates are often based on the nests laid on a particular beach over 
time. However, there is no explanation for the considerable fluctuations recorded in the 
yearly number of nests (Schulz, 1982). In Suriname, there is very little data on the 
number of nests a female lays per nesting season and the length of the non-breeding cycle, 
therefore, it is very difficult to estimate population size (Schulz, 1982). The wide 
fluctuations are evident in Table 2, which shows the numbers of nests over the years.
Data collection is incomplete and sporadic since 1990 as a result of the civil conflict. 
However, the population of olive ridley's appears to have declined significantly while the 
green and leatherback turtles have increased, with the exception of 1990, the beginning of 
the civil conflict (see table 2).
5.3 Creation of the Galibi Nature Reserve
The process by which the Galibi Nature Reserve was established is an important 
starting point. In the early 1960s employees of the Forest Service noticed large groups o f 
olive ridley marine turtles nesting on the Elianti and Galibi beaches. This was the first 
report of large groups of olive ridleys nesting in the Western Atlantic and it prompted 
further scientific observation. It was determined that the area around the mouth of the 
Marowijne river was an important nesting site not only for these turtles (Lepidochelys 
olivacea), but also for the green turtle (Chelonia mydas) and the leatherback 
(Dermochelys coriacea) (Reichart, 1992). Since virtually all marine turtle species are 
threatened with extinction, the Suriname Forest Service proposed that all of the Galibi 
beaches (Elianti, Baboensanti and Galibi) be accorded protected area status.
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Table 2: Number of nests per species, per year, in Suriname (Reichart, 1992; Reichart et 
al., 2000).
year olive ridley leatherback green
1968 2875 200 5000
1970 1750 255 3115
1972 1270 380 6885
1974 1080 785 7465
1976 1160 670 8080
1978 870 2160 8465
1980 1020 1300 4510
1982 1045 3680 4180
1984 944 7291 7546
1986 537 3599 5879
1988 563 11436 6776
1990 175 1182 1524
1999 136 7524 7524
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Under Suriname's Nature Protection Law o f 1954, an area can be designated as a 
protected area if it is "deemed to possess varied nature and landscape beauty or because of 
the presence from a scientific or cultural point of view, important flora, fauna or 
geological objects" (Government of Suriname, 1954). The Nature Protection Law and the 
Game Law (both from 1954) provide the legal basis for nature reserves, and in 1969, the 
Galibi Nature Reserve was formally created.
Since the creation of the nature reserve, there have been numerous conflicts 
between park managers of the Forest Service and the local Amerindian population that 
live near the Galibi Nature Reserve area. The conflicts usually revolved around issues 
relating to access to the reserve for subsistence activities and the collection of turtle eggs 
(Kloos, 1971; F. Baal, personal communication, June 23,2000; R. Slyngaard, personal 
communication, June 21,2000; anonymous interviewees).
The Amerindian population currently inhabiting the area are of Carib descent (see 
Kloos, 1971 for an ethnography of Carib society in Suriname). While there are no longer 
any permanent settlements in the Galibi Nature Reserve, there are numerous fishing 
camps, agricultural plots and the abandoned village of Galibi from which the reserve gets 
its name. Approximately 1,(XX) people live in the villages of Christiaankondre and 
Langamankondre, a few kilometres to the south of the nature reserve. Prior to the 
establishment of the reserve, the inhabitants of both villages used the reserve for 
traditional subsistence agriculture, hunting, fishing and the collection of turtle eggs for 
consumption and for sale. Much of the area around the villages, including the nature 
reserve, are considered by the village inhabitants as traditional lands and, therefore, nature 
reserve regulations were seen as an infringement on their rights (anonymous 
interviewees). The fact that tribal (or village) land claims have not been legally
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recognized by government further adds to the tension relating to the management of the 
nature reserve.
Under the Surinamese constitution, Amerindian and Maroon rights are not 
property rights but customary law rights which can be superseded by statute constitutional 
law. Presidential and ministerial decrees, resolutions and regulations. Customary law 
only applies to villages and adjacent agricultural land, not to hunting, fishing or other 
resource use lands. According to this law, Amerindian and Maroon village and 
agricultural land rights will be respected unless there is a conflict with the general 
national interest (Government of Suriname, 1982). General national interest includes any 
project within the framework of an approved development plan such as mining, logging, 
tourism and conservation. Therefore, Amerindian and Maroon land rights are weak and 
subject to compromise from a number of different "national" objectives.
5.3.1 History of the Creation of the Gaiihi Nature Reserve
By 1967, numerous scientific surveys of nesting marine turtles had begun on all of 
the Galibi area beaches and it was determined that the local amerindian population 
harvested a significant number of eggs that would soon result in the local extinction of the 
Olive Ridley species. Since the local population were identified as a threat to the survival 
of the marine turtles as a result of over-harvesting of eggs for sale, their cooperation was 
sought in protecting the nesting sites. Village meetings were held to determine if the 
villages would cooperate in the 1967 project, funded in part by the World Wildlife Fund 
(WWF) and the Foundation for Nature Preservation in Suriname (STINASU). The 
project would require village inhabitants to mark and claim nests and they would be 
compensated at a rate of $0.01 (U.S.) per egg (approximately $1 per nest). Dissent was 
raised over such issues as the validity of the threat of marine turtle extinction, the amount
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of money paid as compensation and the interference in their territory. Conflict between 
the perceptions of local resource users and government resource managers over resource 
abundance reflect the difference in perceptions and values between western scientific 
knowledge and traditional local knowledge.
In the end, the village agreed to cooperate. Through the project, 2500 guilders 
($700 U.S.) was paid to 32 collectors, a number of villagers were hired as labour to build 
camps for biologists, and to rebury turtle eggs either in their original nests, or elsewhere 
for safe hatching. Similar projects were initiated in 1968 and 1969 where villagers 
participated in marking nests and were paid $1.50 U.S. per nest in both years.
While plans were under way for the development of the area as a nature reserve 
throughout the late 1960s, representatives from the villages were not involved in the 
process. They were first notifîed of the reserve by a sign on the beach and immediately 
jumped to conclusions, some erroneous, some not, about how the reserve would restrict 
their economic activities. It was felt that they would lose the right to hunt, fish, practice 
agriculture and collect turtle eggs in the vicinity (Kloos, 1971). While turtle eggs are used 
as a source of food, their most important use is as a source of income through sale to the 
urbanized public where they are considered a delicacy.
Village inhabitants were also informed of the construction of a guest house on the 
reserve, which was an attempt by park management to boost nature tourism in the area. 
Village concerns regarding hunting and fishing rights, infringement on what they 
considered their territory and the concern over the effect of increased tourism were not 
heard and were not included in the process of the creation of the nature reserve. As a 
result, there was strong resistance to the nature reserve from the beginning. Through 
village meetings, a resistance approach was decided upon where local people would
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ignore nature reserve regulations and over-charge for tourist transport to discourage 
tourism to the reserve.
Eventually, through a series of meetings between forest service representatives and 
village leaders held in the early 1970s, it was agreed that residents of the local 
communities could continue to use the reserve for subsistence purposes (plant collecting, 
hunting, fishing, agriculture). STINASU obtained permission from the Forest Service to 
control the turtle egg harvesting with the cooperation of the local Amerindian community.
Through the turtle egg conservation program, STINASU assumed ownership of all 
of the turtle nests and eggs. They then contracted out the collection of eggs from 
endangered nests to local Amerindian harvesters. The eggs were then sold, by STINASU, 
to the urban public in Paramaribo, where they are considered a delicacy. Amerindian 
harvesters were paid a fee for collection and a fee for transportation of the eggs to the 
market in the city. Such a program allowed for government control over the turtle egg 
market and ensured that only eggs from endangered nests (resulting from high tides or 
beach erosion) were collected. Village residents were also allowed to collect eggs from 
nests outside of the nature reserve, but for consumption purposes only, and not for sale.
However, in the mid 1980s, based on research on turtle populations, it was 
determined that greater effort was needed to ensure the survival of the marine turtles 
locally. Therefore, the number of eggs that could be collected had to be significantly 
reduced to protect the species. The eggs in endangered nest sites (due to tides, beach 
erosion or high water levels) were no longer collected for sale, but were reburied in a safe 
location. The reported causes of continued population decline were continued poaching 
of eggs and turtle mortality as a result of off-shore fishing nets. With the pending 
elimination of turtle eggs as a source of income, greater emphasis was placed on nature
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tourism to create other economic opportunities at both the national and local level.
In the midst of the civil conflict in the eastern portion of Suriname and in the 
interior (1989-1992), the nature reserve was occupied by local Caribs and both the Forest 
Service and STINASU were denied access to the area. Under such conditions, all turtle 
conservation programs ended, as did nature tourism to the area. It was also during this 
time that the Galibi Management Plan was created without input from the local level, as a 
result of the occupation of the nature reserve. However, one of the goals of the 
management plan is to increase local involvement in the management of the nature 
reserve (Reichart, 1992). The resolution to the conflict in 1992 began a new series of 
discussions and agreements on land rights nationally and on the sharing of benefits and 
costs of the nature reserve locally. The new partnerships in conservation and 
development have evolved from such negotiation and will be discussed below.
In order to examine the conservation and development situation in the Galibi 
Nature Reserve area, it is important to examine the post-civil conflict framework for 
environmental management in Suriname and all of the actors and organizations at the 
local, national and international level with interests in the Galibi Nature Reserve.
5.4 Environmental/Park Management Framework In Suriname
With approximately 90% of its original forest intact (Baal, 1999) as a result of the 
concentration of population and economic activities along the coast and in the capital city 
of Paramaribo, the potential for nature conservation in Suriname is considered to be 
among the best in South America. As such, there is recognition on the part of the 
Government of Suriname and of international environmental organizations that the future 
of economic development rests with appropriate balance between use and conservation of 
natural resources. Policies and legislation regarding protected areas play an important
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role in achieving such a balance.
5.4.1 Role of Government Organizations in Galibi Nature Reserve
The Nature Preservation Law and the Game Law, both from 1954, form the basis 
of protected area legislation and management in Suriname. Based on those laws, the 
protection of the natural environment is needed for science, recreation and educational 
purposes, subject to ethical, aesthetic and economical considerations. To be designated a 
nature reserve:
the area has to satisfy the following requirements: that it deserves 
protection by the Government because of its varied nature and scenic 
beauty; and/or because of the presence of - from a scientifically or 
culturally significant point of view - important flora, fauna, or geological 
objects (Government of Suriname, 1954).
Once an area has been declared a nature reserve and receives protected area status, 
the management for the area falls under the direction of the Nature Conservation Division 
of the Forest Service, a subdivision of the Ministry of Natural Resources (see figure 2). 
The Forest Service is the ultimate authority with complete control over all activities that 
occur in the nature reserves. The Nature Conservation division of the Forest Service is 
responsible for the development o f management plans, patrolling and enforcement of 
rules and regulations in the nature reserve and nature reserve maintenance. Each 
protected area or reserve has its own manager who reports directly to the head of the 
Nature Conservation. The manager of the nature reserve is responsible for the day to day 
management activities and for ensuring that the mandate of conservation set out by the 
Forest Service is followed.
The government approach to nature reserve management appears to be very 
centralized. However, in the mid-1990 s the Nature Conservation division instituted a 
two-track approach to nature reserve management. The change in approach resulted out
Figure 2: Relationships between Government, NGO’s and Local Organizations at the Local and National Level
National National Environment Council NIMOS
composed o f  government - 
officials appointed by 
President
STINASU '
Nature 
Preservation 
Commission
President National Assembly
Vice President
• Ministry o f  Natural 
Resources
Council o f  Advice
■ All other ministries
Director o f  STINASU
/  I. \
nature
tourism
sea turtle 
conservation
research & 
education 
within N.R.
Director o f la n d  Affairs 
Sub-director o f  forests 
Forest Service —
t
production development 1
Biotropic
nature conservation 
division
I
M anager Galibi 
N.R.
Consultation Commission 
District Commissioner 
STINASU 
Nature Conservation 
Forest Service 
Fisheries 
Capt. o f  Christiaankondre 
Capt. o f  Langamankondre
Local Langamankondre 
village council —
Captain
local government
NOO = non-governmental organization 
NIMOS = National Institute for Environmental Management 
STINASU = Foundation for Nature Preservation Suriname 
STIDUNAL = Foundation for Sustainable Nature Conservation Alusiaka
Board o f  directors
STIDUNAL
District Commissioner
Christiaankondre 
village council
T
Consultation Commission
(^
Ciq>tam
local tourist 
organizations
UNDP-GEF
N.R. = Nature reserve 
Capt. = Captain
UNDP-GEF = United Nations Development Programme - Global Environment Facility
78
of the recognition of the desire of local communities to have greater involvement in the 
management of nature reserves and over the conflicts between long-term objectives and 
short-term benefits.
The two-track approach has both a long term and a short-term focus. The long­
term focus is on management plans and relies on input from local communities, rules of 
agreement and on consultation committees composed of government and local 
community officials. It fits into the model of decentralization discussed in Chapter Two, 
where greater local involvement is achieved in decision-making but the ultimate authority 
rests with the Forest Service. The short-term focus is on specific projects where greater 
authority is devolved to the local level for individual projects. It relies on lower level 
consultation between individual park managers and all of the local stakeholders that strive 
to meet the objectives of the management plan while providing benefits to local 
stakeholders.
The Foundation for Nature Preservation in Suriname (STINASU), a semi- 
government organization founded in 1969, also plays a significant role in the Galibi 
Nature Reserve. When the numerous nature reserves were being created, the government 
wanted to ensure that the reserves be used in order to justify their protection. STINASU 
was founded with the mandate to ensure that the goals of nature reserves (to promote 
scientific research, nature education and nature tourism) are achieved.
While the management and protection of nature reserves rests with the Nature 
Conservation Division of the Forest Service, STINASU was created to oversee research 
and nature tourism in the reserves. STINASU, a non-profit organization, enjoys the 
benefits of government support through wages to employees, the use of government 
infrastructure such as office space, trucks and boats and the exclusive right to nature
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tourism within nature reserves in Suriname. Being a semi-govemmental organization, 
STINASU is also in a much better position to receive funding from international 
conservation organizations. It is also able to avoid the bureaucratic tangles that allow it to 
provide more efficient services to tourists, to access supplies and to finance its own 
projects.
STINASU is run by a board of directors, of which the Minister of Natural 
Resources is the chair (the other board positions are filled by various ministers and 
directors of government departments). The board appoints a director who is responsible 
for the supervision of the three aspects of STINASU’s work: nature tourism, marine turtle 
conservation and research and education within the nature reserves.
STINASU operates a guest house in the Galibi Nature Reserve and controls all 
tourism to the reserve. Interested tourists contact STINASU at their Paramaribo office 
and STINASU makes arrangements for travel, accommodation and meals. Apart from 
nature tourism in the Galibi Nature Reserve, STINASU is most active in marine turtle 
conservation and research.
Therefore, the Nature Conservation division of the Forest Service is responsible 
for all nature reserve activities such as patrol, enforcement and maintenance while 
STINASU is responsible for all activities that occur within the nature reserves, mainly 
tourism, research and education.
5.4.2 Role of International Organizations
There are numerous intemational organizations which sponsor and/or take part in 
conservation activities in the Galibi nature reserve. The WWF is the most prominent 
organization because of its interest in the protection of the endangered marine turtle 
species. They act as a broker that influence national and local organizations to promote
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nature conservation and sustainable resource use. They provide the funding and the 
expertise for the development of management plans that meet the conservation objectives 
of the WWF.
As such, the goal of WWF is to simply provide funds and technical expertise for 
marine turtle research and encourage national and local organizations to carry out the 
projects. Under those circumstances, WWF commands significant power over national 
and local organizations that must meet WWF objectives to adhere to funding 
requirements (Drijver et al., 1997).
It is also the WWF that coordinates intemational efforts for sea turtle 
conservation. They are in the process of developing a regional sea turtle conservation 
program for Guyana, Suriname and French Guiana that focuses on protecting nesting 
habitat, reducing the threat of fisheries and improving regional cooperation in 
conservation.
Biotopic (a Dutch conservation organization) is also involved directly in the Galibi 
Nature Reserve, although to a lesser extent. Since 1995, Biotopic has carried out 
numerous studies on marine turtle populations as well as promoting conservation 
programs. They are currently executing a conservation program in cooperation with 
STINASU and STIDUNAL which includes field research, an awareness program and 
stimulation of intemational cooperation.
Finally, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Global Environment 
Facility (GEF) is active in the Galibi Nature Reserve as part of its biological diversity 
conservation program. The GEF Small Grants Program provides grant support to local 
NGOs and community-based organizations, aimed at the implementation o f community- 
level activities that provide economic altematives to unsustainable resource use (UNDP,
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2000). In the Galibi area, GEF grants have been provided to village groups to outfit boats 
for tourism; allowing for greater participation in nature tourism, and increasing the 
economic benefits of marine turtle conservation. Therefore, they indirectly influence the 
use of tourism as a source of sustainable economic development at the local level.
5.4.3 Role of Local Organizations
After the resolution of the civil conflict in 1992, the villages of Christiaankondre 
and Langamankondre created the Stichting Duurazaam Natuurbeheer Alusiaka 
(STIDUNAL) (Foundation for Sustainable Nature Conservation Alusiaka) in order to 
cooperate directly with STINASU. STIDUNAL is an organization that is made up of a 
chair and board members who are elected by village councils. The stated objective of 
STIDUNAL is to represent the local indigenous community in the participation in the 
preservation of biodiversity and to stimulate local social, educational and economic 
development. In such a position, STIDUNAL promotes biodiversity research, nature 
tourism and organizes the lodging and recreational facilities in the village.
STIDUNAL acts as the only broker between STINASU and the village. It is 
through STIDUNAL that the village negotiates and receives the benefits of tourism to the 
nature reserve. When STINASU has tourists that need to get to the Galibi Nature 
Reserve, STIDUNAL is contacted and they arrange for one of the various community tour 
groups operating in the village to transport the tourists from Albina to Galibi.
STIDUNAL is responsible for ensuring that the village tour boats provide formal and 
professional service for tourists and that they meet the standards set by STINASU. The 
money that STIDUNAL receives from STINASU for tourist transport is distributed to the 
various organizations in the village (who are represented by the various tour operators). 
There are no private, independent tour operators. Tourism transport is a communal
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village activity. The revenue from transport does not go towards individual tour 
operators, rather tour operators are paid a portion for their time and the remaining revenue 
goes towards village projects.
STIDUNAL is also responsible for marine turtle conservation training and 
education programs in the village. They ensure that all of the tour operators are 
knowledgeable about turtles and that they know how to approach them safely without 
endangering the nesting process. STIDUNAL also promotes turtle conservation programs 
in the village through education programs aimed at school children. Finally, when 
STINASU requires labour for maintenance or construction projects in the nature reserve, 
it is STIDUNAL that recruits labourers from the village. STUDINAL has the authority to 
control the local economic benefits and it participates with other government and 
intemational organizations in the nature reserve management process.
Table 3 and figure 2 provide a summary of the organizations involved in the 
Galibi Nature Reserve and their interactions at the national, intemational and local levels.
5.5 Co<Management of the Galibi Nature Reserve
As mentioned above, the Nature Conservation Division of the Forest Service is 
responsible for the management of all activities that occur in the nature reserves in 
Suriname. STINASU has obtained exclusive permission for nature tourism in the nature 
reserves. However, due to concems of local community members in the villages of 
Christiaankondre and Langamankondre, the process of management of the Galibi Nature 
Reserve has evolved into a type of co-management.
Co-management, as defined in chapter three, involves an arrangement where 
decision-making powers are shared between govemment and local resource users which 
allows for the integration o f different objectives, values and approaches to resource
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Table 3: Organizations involved in the Galibi Nature Reserve
Organization Role in the Galibi Nature Reserve
Govemment Nature Conservation Division of 
the Suriname Forest Service
As a govemment agency, it is 
responsible for all nature reserve 
activities, management and 
enforcement of rules and 
regulations.
Foundation for Nature Preservation 
Suriname (STINASU)
As a non-govemmental 
organization (NGO) linked with 
the Forest Service, it is 
responsible for sea turtle 
conservation, research and nature 
tourism in all nature reserves.
Intemational World Wide Fund for Nature 
(WWF)
Intemational NGO funds sea 
turtle research and conservation 
projects, provides logistical and 
technical support and provides 
funds for wage supplements for 
STINASU and Forest Service 
employees.
Biotopic Dutch NGO that undertakes sea 
turtle research and promotes 
conservation in cooperation with 
STINASU and STIDUNAL.
United Nations Development 
Programme -  Global Environment 
Facility (UNDP-GEF)
UNDP-GEF provides loans to 
local residents to take part in 
environmentally sustainable 
activities such as nature tourism. 
Local loans have been used to buy 
and outfit boats for tourist 
transport.
Local Foundation for Sustainable Nature 
Conservation Alusiaka 
(STIDUNAL)
Local Amerindian organization 
responsible for biodiversity 
conservation and nature tourism 
activities in the villages of 
Christiaankondre and 
Langamankondre in cooperation 
with STINASU and the Forest 
Service.
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management. With the Galibi Nature Reserve, there are two separate but related 
arrangements that together comprise co-management; a consultation committee which is 
responsible for determining management objectives and goals, and agreements between 
STINASU and STIDUNAL which determine the method in which the benefits and costs 
of conservation are shared.
The formal element of the Galibi Nature Reserve co-management arrangement is 
the consultation committee (the committee is responsible for determining management 
objectives and actions for the nature reserve). The committee is composed of the District 
Commissioner (the head of the local govemment), the director of STINASU, the head of 
the Nature Conservation division of the Forest Service, the head of the Fisheries 
Department, the Captain (village leader/chief) of Christiaankondre and the Captain of 
Langamankondre. The meetings are held four times a year at the location of all of the 
members on a rotating basis. It is at these meetings where grievances are voiced, 
solutions proposed and courses of action determined. Topics of conversation range from 
the development of management plans, expansion of tourism activities, turtle 
conservation initiatives and nature reserve rules and regulations. The functioning of the 
consultation committee rests on consensus decision-making where all concems, 
objectives and approaches are considered equally. While various approaches are 
considered, the objective of marine turtle conservation is fixed and any activity that would 
have a negative impact on marine turtle populations rejected.
One excellent example of how the consultation commission functions relates to 
the closing of the fishing season. It was noticed by the residents in the Amerindian 
villages that a large number of dead, mature marine turtles were washing up on the beach 
as a result of being caught in off-shore fishing nets. The majority of off-shore fishing in
85
the area is not done by local people but by fishers that originate from Paramaribo. These 
concems were raised at the consultation commission meeting by the village 
representatives.
Through discussions at the meetings, it was decided that the most suitable course 
of action would be to close the fishing season in the area of the Galibi beaches during the 
prime marine turtle nesting season between May and July. The Department of Fisheries 
was able to close the fishery because it had the backing of the local people, the Nature 
Conservation Division and the Forest Service (Baal, personal communication. May 30th 
2000). As a result of conservation concems raised by local residents, a fishery with 
significant outside interests was closed for the benefît of local conservation.
The consultation commission is the forum in which local people are represented in 
the decision-making process with regard to the management of the Galibi Nature Reserve. 
While the meetings are closed to the public, the elected Captains of the villages are 
present. Village representatives feel as if they have an equal voice on the committee and 
while disagreements are frequent, compromises are sought that are suitable to all parties.
The less formal arrangement between STINASU and STIDUNAL to share the 
costs and benefits of conservation is much more active. It focuses on short term goals and 
short term projects for both the conservation and development of nature tourism.
Meetings are open to the public, are held more often, a wider range of topics are discussed 
and all stakeholders can be involved. While the consultation committee is where 
discussion occurs and plans are made, it is through the arrangements of these two 
organizations that integration of conservation and development occurs.
The arrangements between STINASU and STIDUNAL cover such issues as 
tourism revenues, activities and standards, marine turtle conservation and conservation
8 6
education. It works like this. In exchange for cooperation in marine turtle conservation, 
the village, through STIDUNAL receives economic benefits. Some of the benefits 
depend directly on the survival of the marine turtle population, effectively linking 
conservation to development while other benefits are indirect. Examples of direct 
economic benefits include employment, tour boat operations and traditional 
performances. Indirect economic benefits include payments by STINASU into village 
funds, sale of crafts and sale of food and refreshments.
In the agreement, all tourist groups larger than five people must be transported by 
Stidunal, using village tour operators. Tourists are charged approximately $15 U.S. per 
person for one way travel. STINASU provides training to tour guides to ensure that the 
guides meet the requirements of the Forest Service in the way that they approach nesting 
turtles. While transporting tourists, the tour operators often stop in the villages of 
Christiaankondre and Langamankondre where tourists can purchase handcrafts and 
refreshments from the village gift shop. Individuals construct handcrafts that are sold 
collectively in the gift shop, with the proceeds for each sale going to the individual 
artisan. A village traditional dance group is available to perform for tourists in the Galibi 
Nature reserve, for which the dancers are paid. At the end of every year, STINASU 
returns a portion of its profits from nature tourism in Galibi to STIDUNAL which is then 
used for various community development projects. A small guest house has been 
constructed by one of the tour groups in the village to obtain more revenue from tourism. 
STIDUNAL has also entered into negotiations to begin taking tourists to see the large 
number of birds that over winter on the sand spits off the coast. The prime bird watching 
season does not coincide with the turtle nesting season so that the overall tourist season 
would be extended.
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All labour for the nature reserve is provided by the village through STIDUNAL. 
When the nature reserve requires labour for maintenance or construction, STIDUNAL is 
contacted and they select people from the village to provide the labour. The village 
workers are then paid a wage from the Forest Service. While there is not a formal 
arrangement to hire and train village members for the Forest Service, there have been a 
few village residents that have worked as guards to patrol the reserve (R. Slyngaard, 
personal communication, June 21,2000). Village members are also hired to provide 
services for the guest lodge in the reserve.
STIDUNAL is active in promoting marine turtle egg conservation in the village, 
however, they feel that there is very little external support for such activities. It is also 
believed that conservation efforts are focused too much on the village and not enough is 
being done to eliminate poaching of eggs in French Guiana or from other Amerindian 
villages. Much of the conservation education relates to how the economic benefits of 
tourism are dependent on the survival of the marine turtles. It then focuses on what can 
be done to improve the chances of marine turtle survival.
Through such education programs, the village decided to ban the commercial 
turtle egg harvest completely. According to village residents, such initiative came from 
the village and not the govemment. By deciding to ban egg harvesting, it suggests that 
the economic benefits that are received from nature tourism outweigh the economic 
benefits of turtle egg collection. However, it is unclear whether the benefits are 
immediate or over the long term as it was also a strategic move on the part o f STIDUNAL 
designed to gain further trust from STINASU and the Forest Service and to demonstrate 
the village's interest in conservation and management (anonymous interviewee).
In summary, the co-management arrangement that exists between the villages of
8 8
Christiaankondre, Langamankondre and the Forest Service with regards to the Galibi 
Nature Reserve are comprised o f two elements. There exists the formal consultation 
committee which is the forum for discussion on park management objectives, plans and 
actions and there is the arrangement between STINASU and STIDUNAL which governs 
how tourism activities and revenues are shared. The two elements are connected by the 
fact that STINASU is present in both bodies and STIDUNAL works in close cooperation 
with the two village representatives on the consultation committee.
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Chapter 6 
Analysis of Case Study
The co-management arrangement for the Galibi Nature Reserve has been 
described in detail. It will now be examined through the theoretical propositions that 
have been identified as essential for the integration of conservation and development at 
the local level. Three main theoretical propositions have been identified previously as 
being integral for effective co-management arrangements where the goal is to link 
conservation to development:
1) conservation activities must be linked to local development activities;
2) local people must participate with authority and power in the decision-making process 
of all activities; and
3) common property resource management systems must be integrated into state 
management systems.
These three propositions form the framework through which the co-management 
arrangement for the Galibi Nature Reserve is examined. They will be used to demonstrate 
whether they exist and if they improve the effectiveness of the co-management 
arrangement.
6.1 Linking Conservation and Local Development
While the manner in which conservation and development are linked varies from 
case to case in the literature, the main requirement is that local populations should benefit 
directly from conservation. There should be an arrangement where proponents of 
development and conservation can work together, and development objectives should be 
placed ahead of conservation objectives to gain local support. The co-management
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arrangement for the Galibi Nature Reserve is assessed on the basis of how these elements 
are addressed.
In terms of conservation initiatives being directly linked to local development, the 
Galibi co-management has been successful relative to other examples in the literature. 
Unlike other examples, where local residents are simply compensated for limiting their 
resource use, in Galibi, development opportunities rely on the successful conservation of 
the sea turtle. The major development activities are based on generating income and 
employment from nature tourism. It is clearly understood that without the conservation of 
the marine turtles, tourism suffers. Therefore, local residents are interested in the 
conservation of the marine turtle, if only to increase tourism revenues. Conservation 
efforts and local development have been linked. The degree to which local people are 
involved in conservation and tourism can be debated (and will be discussed below), but at 
least to this extent, the success of development activities is dependent on successful 
conservation.
However, successful conservation of a migrating species such as the sea turtle is 
dependent on more than just local actions. The local development initiatives are 
dependent on the long-term survival of sea turtles, which in turn are dependent on 
numerous factors outside of local, and even national control. The regional sea turtle 
conservation program, developed by the WWF attempts to address this issue through a 
number of activities (education, capacity building, legislation and community support 
throughout the Guianas), of which the linking of conservation to local development is one 
example.
The second element of importance is how the co-management arrangement allows 
for the proponents of development and of conservation to work together. In Galibi, there
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is the consultation committee which deals mostly with conservation and nature reserve 
management issues. Within this committee, representatives from the village, the 
government and the organization of STINASU are present, and together they set 
conservation goals and objectives, along with the rules and regulations to achieve them. 
Informants felt that their input in the consultation committee was considered and that they 
made valuable contributions for linking conservation to development.
With respect to development, the arrangement between STINASU and 
STIDUNAL involves development activities, mainly nature tourism. It is in this forum 
that development (tourism) activities, rules and revenue sharing initiatives are discussed. 
When STINASU and STIDUNAL come to an agreement on how to manage and share 
tourism benefits, their concerns and proposals are discussed at the consultation 
committee.
It is too simplistic to view proponents of conservation and of development as two 
separate entities. Due to the reliance of development activities (nature tourism) on 
conservation, conflicts between conservation and development initiatives have already 
been diminished in the Galibi case. The reliance on nature tourism necessitates co­
operation between development activities and conservationist activities. The conflicts 
that do arise are frequently about various stakeholder's shares in tourism, and the rules and 
regulations governing tourism (ie development benefits), and not about the imposed 
conservation rules and park management regulations.
West (1991) warns against the potential for local development and conservation to 
be coopted by government or other outside interests (such as large NGOs). While the 
majority of the discussion on the subject fits in more under the section on participation, it 
warrants a brief discussion here. Due to the large number of organizations involved in
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development and conservation in the Galibi Nature Reserve, (government, local, national 
and international NGO's, UNEP, and local government), it is difficult to determine who 
sets the objectives. All of these groups wield significant power in terms of funding 
requirements and, therefore, are able to determine the rules of the game under which 
conservation and development proceeds. For example, the UNEP-GEF grants support 
local small-scale tourism activities. The WWF provides funds for marine turtle 
conservation activities, financial and institutional support to STINASU to carry out 
sustainable tourism and technical help and research funding to the Nature Conservation 
Division of the Forest Service.
Meanwhile, many local residents have raised concerns about the appropriateness 
of increased tourism and the effects that it would have on the village way of life. In this 
regard, the dichotomy between local interests and conservation interests is similar to the 
problems encountered with ICDPs and the MAB projects. By placing the emphasis 
primarily on conservation and allowing development initiatives that meet certain 
conservation requirements, the potential for more appropriate local development based on 
local needs and objectives is lost. Such developments may in fact benefit conservation 
and would be more widely embraced by the community. Therefore, while nature tourism 
has been adopted by international NGOs as the method through which the village can 
benefit from conservation, fishing remains as the main source of income for many of the 
village residents. Valid questions arise about how tourism became the adopted practice 
and by whom. The issue rests with who has final control over what goes on, which will 
be discussed in a later section.
Many authors stress the importance of placing development objectives ahead of 
conservation objectives to gain support of local communities (Wells and Brandon, 1992;
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Hackel,1993; Viet et al. 1995). The basis of this belief is that without greater benefits, 
conservation efforts will not be embraced by local residents. Viet et al. (1995) mention 
the importance of creating situations where local people can obtain higher revenues from 
sustainable practices than from unsustainable ones. When the Galibi Nature Reserve was 
created, there was an attempt to compensate local residents for conservation efforts by 
paying residents a fee for egg collection. However, the compensation was not deemed to 
be adequate and it did not involve enough of the local residents. Therefore, local 
residents did not participate fully in the conservation of marine turtles and conservation 
efforts were threatened.
The Nature Conservation Division of the Forest Service has always placed a 
higher priority on conservation efforts, which can be expected from a government 
conservation agency. STINASU has attempted to achieve a balance between conservation 
and development because of the understanding of the reliance of nature tourism on 
conservation. STIDUNAL, the village organization places greater emphasis on tourism 
revenues than on conservation activities. Through the various agreements that make up 
the co-management arrangement, attempts have been made to accommodate the 
development objectives of local residents with the conservation goal of the nature reserve.
Sea turtle conservation has been linked to local development activities, however, the 
development opportunities of nature tourism have been imposed on the community 
through a combination of implicit and explicit external forces (government and 
international NGOs) and has not been completely accepted by the community.
As a result, it is evident that the co-management arrangement for the Galibi Nature 
Reserve has been successful in integrating conservation efforts with local development 
activities. Without considering the aspect of participation (which will be discussed
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below), it can be argued that village development activities have been linked to the 
conservation of the marine turtles. Based on the fact that the village voluntarily decided 
to ban the commercial egg harvest, it is evident that through nature tourism, the village 
receives direct economic benefits which are greater than the potential economic benefits 
from harvesting turtle eggs.
6.2 Local Participation in Conservation and Development
It has been suggested that in order for conservation and development to be 
achieved, local residents must participate with authority and power in the decision­
making process at all stages. Local residents must participate in the setting of objectives, 
planning, implementation and management. The ability of local communities to have 
control over and share in the benefits of resource initiatives through the establishment of 
local institutions to ensure continued participation is also important (Wells and Brandon, 
1992).
Based on how empowerment has been defined above, both the Forest Service and 
STINASU are responsive to the views, aspirations and needs of local residents in the 
Galibi area and, therefore, some degree of local authority and empowerment exists. Local 
residents, through both STUDINAL and village representatives in the consultation 
committee, have the ability to shape the actions of STINASU and the Forest Service. 
There are many instances where the Forest Service or STINASU have modified plans in 
response to concerns by local residents. The closing of the fîshing season (as described 
above) is one such example, as well as concerns over number of tourists, location of guest 
houses and tourism revenue. However, the consultation committee still relies on a top- 
down approach where local people are given responsibility to follow conservation 
objectives but they are not involved in the determination of such objectives other than
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through their committee reprresentatives. While efforts have been made to force the 
commercial fisheries to adopt the use of turtle-excluder devices in their nets, sea turtle 
conservation efforts by the Forest Service and the WWF focus on the elimination of 
"poaching" as the main reason for marine turtles being threatened. While poaching of 
turtle eggs has an impact on sea turtle populations, it is by no means the only cause of 
population decline. Other factors such as impacts of off-shore fishing, development and 
modification of beach habitat elsewhere in the Guianas or the erosion of beaches play an 
equally important role. However, the primary focus when the nature reserve was created 
was the elimination of poachers. Therefore, the goal has been to create other economic 
options for "poachers" through tourism. While tourism may be the best approach to link 
conservation and development in the nature reserve, it was not an approach that was 
decided upon by village residents.
The problems with traditional park management still exist, (exclusionary, top 
down, hierarchical etc) and they are incorporated into development models based on the 
same approach (i.e.; modernization theory). By providing other tourism opportunities, 
greater economic benefits are expected to trickle down to all village residents and 
eliminate the need to "poach" turtle eggs. It is still a technocratic process where 
participation is limited to involvement with conservation objectives. Goals, objectives 
and methods of implementation are still set by protected area authorities and local 
residents are consulted and given the opportunity to participate with the predetermined 
goals, mainly tourism.
In the consultation committee, local participation is limited to the two 
representatives of the villages, being the two village Captains, and it is their responsibility 
to act in the interests of the village. Village concerns are heard and they are consulted
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regarding marine turtle conservation, tourism, village revenues and the political situation. 
While attempts are made to arrive at a consensus for all decisions, authority still rests 
with the Nature Conservation Division of the Forest Service.
In the arrangement between STINASU and STIDUNAL, both organizations are 
empowered to make decisions. The conflicts that arise involve participation in 
consultation, setting of goals and planning, and they all occur at the village level and are 
not conflicts between the village residents and STINASU. STIDUNAL has been 
criticized by village residents for not generating enough involvement at the village level 
and not acting in the village's best interests, but in the interests of village residents 
involved in tourism. It is felt that STIDUNAL is not taking an active role in negotiating 
revenue sharing arrangements, but is simply accepting what STINASU offers. These 
problems are related to the accountability of STIDUNAL at the village level and are 
separate from the arrangement between STINASU and STIDUNAL. As a result of these 
concerns, the members of the STIDUNAL board were replaced through village council 
elections and the feeling within the new STIDUNAL board is that the village must take a 
more active role and increase its responsibility for getting the most out of the arrangement 
with STINASU. It is not STINASU’s responsibility to simply provide benefits.
It is important that participation occurs in all stages, in planning and 
implementation, and in benefits (Kiss, 1990). Through the co-management arrangement 
for the Galibi Nature Reserve, local participation does occur. Village residents participate 
and benefit from the nature reserve directly in the form of employment and tourism and 
indirectly through revenue sharing which is deposited in a village fund for village 
development projects. Effort is made to consult local views, traditions, constraints and 
expectations in the planning stage. For example the village has been consulted about the
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size, design and location of a new guest house that is planned for the nature reserve and 
there are frequent discussions with regards to expected tourism revenues.
Local participation in the implementation of conservation and development 
initiatives are relatively weak. As Metcalfe (1994) describes with the CAMPFIRE 
example, there has been difficulty in obtaining active involvement at the household level. 
Aside from the individuals actively involved in village organizations for nature tourism, 
village residents do not concern themselves greatly with nature reserve issues. While 
there have been a couple of village residents employed in the Forest Service as guards, 
there is no specific effort made to involve local residents in organizational, technical or 
managerial training in conservation activities outside of tourism. This is an area where 
STIDUNAL would like to become more active. However, with the arrangement between 
STINASU and STIDUNAL, the latter is left on its own to implement projects out of the 
revenues it collects from tourism. In this arrangement, once again, it is through village 
councils that village projects are created and implemented, generating high degrees of 
empowerment and autonomy in the distribution of tourism benefits.
Sustaining local participation in conservation and development has been very 
effective in the Galibi co-management arrangement. STIDUNAL, a local organization, 
run strictly through the village and accountable only to the village, is an excellent 
example of the use of local institutions to achieve sustained participation in conservation 
and development. Marine turtle conservation and tourism activities that are undertaken 
by STIDUNAL are incorporated into the routine in which the community functions. 
Tourism operates on a communal basis, there are no independent operators. Decision­
making procedures follow the community approach and are discussed in village council 
meetings where everyone has the opportunity to voice their opinion. With a local
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institution involved, conflicts occur at the village level and are resolved at the village 
level, keeping the Forest Service and STINASU out of local- level conflicts. Village 
residents are also responsible for getting the most out of arrangements and do not rely on 
STINASU to provide for them, which eliminates the welfare approach to development.
Overall, local residents are empowered, participate in benefits, planning and 
implementation and participation is sustained through local institutions. However, in 
many instances, local participation is limited to merely consultation. In the consultation 
committee, local concerns are considered in all activities, but the ultimate authority 
remains with the Nature Conservation Division o f the Forest Service to carry out 
conservation objectives. This is highly unlikely to change because of the national and 
international pressure for sea turtle conservation. Conservation of marine turtles is a 
global conservation objective with support from many international organizations and, 
therefore, it is the number one priority.
In the arrangement between STINASU and STIDUNAL, there is greater 
participation with the village residents at all stages than in the consultation committee. 
However, for tourism to be a sustainable part of the future for the village, greater tourism 
revenues must be achieved or other approaches to generate economic benefits must be 
included in order to encourage greater participation from village residents. Right now, 
STINASU has exclusive right to lodging and food revenues in the nature reserve which 
competes directly with the small guest house located in the village. Greater involvement 
in tourism for the village and STIDUNAL would require STINASU to increase the role 
and responsibilities of STIDUNAL for nature tourism. If that were to occur, STINASU 
could focus more energy and resources on promoting ecotourism to other nature reserves 
while maintaining a supervisory role in Galibi. STIDUNAL would receive greater
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income and control and the village would become more involved in conservation 
activities because there would be increased economic benefits in it.
6.3 Integration of Conunon Property Resource Management
The primary goal of the Galibi Nature Reserve is to protect endangered marine 
turtles and their nesting habitat. The integration of common property resource 
management systems with state-led resource management, through co-management, plays 
a vital role in conservation in examples from the literature (Sekhar, 2000). However, in 
the villages of Christiaankondre and Langamankondre, a CPR system for management of 
turtle eggs has never evolved. Sekhar (2000) suggests that if a resource plays an 
important role in subsistence and is not relatively abundant, then rules governing the use 
of the resource will develop. In the two Amerindian villages, turtle eggs were never seen 
to be scarce and therefore a rigorous CPR system did not evolve. Eggs were also not a 
primary concern from a subsistence point of view, but rather a source of alternative 
income.
Unlike hunting grounds, agricultural plots or fishing grounds, for which there are 
recognized CPR rules in place in the communities, however weak, turtle eggs were 
collected in an ad hoc manner where individuals marked claim to a nest and collected all 
of the eggs. Once a nest was claimed, through a combination of traditions and customs, it 
was considered to be off-limits to other egg harvesters and very little conflict occurred 
(Kloos, 1971). The harvesting of turtle eggs in the past was seen as a quick source of 
supplementary income for village residents, a source of income that was not taken 
advantage of by all village residents.
Probably the best reason for the lack of rigorous CPR institutions results out of the 
nature of shifting cultivation in the Carib society. Kloos (1971) described agricultural
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plots, hunting, fishing and collecting as flexible components of the economy based on an 
abundance of resources that were used on an individual or family basis. The available 
area for agricultural plots, for example, far exceeds the population pressures, and families 
will often let old gardens lie fallow for up to fifteen years. Kloos (1971) also described 
the virtual non-existence of conflict over resource uses. When a resource is depleted in 
one area, resource users simply move to an area where the resource is more plentiful. 
Access to resources is limited through local values and customs, although conflict rarely 
occurs. If an area is being used by one group or family, it is generally off-limits for other 
users and people move on to another area.
While the development of rigorous CPR management systems has not occurred, 
and therefore, they have not been included in the co-management arrangement, the 
manner in which resources, property and individuals are viewed differs greatly between 
government and local resource users. It is the differences in values, traditions and 
activities of daily life that need to be incorporated into co-management arrangements. 
With the co-management arrangement for the Galibi Nature Reserve, attempts have been 
made at incorporating local customs and values into the management arrangement.
The question of property rights and resource claims generates a great deal of 
conflict between representatives of the nature reserve and local residents, and it is not 
dealt with in the co-management arrangement. The village residents use the resources 
surrounding the villages of Christiaankondre and Langamankondre, and consider such 
area their traditional land. The surrounding area includes the Galibi Nature Reserve. The 
government, through the Forest Service have recognized the right of local residents to 
access resources in the area, but have not recognized their traditional land rights. The 
conflicts over land rights reflect the different views and customs dealing with land. The
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government has recognized the land rights within the village boundaries but has ignored 
the larger area that is needed for resources to support local residents' way of life.
The primary way in which local residents are involved with the nature reserve is 
through tourism. Through STIDUNAL, the village has been able to maintain its 
traditional values and methods of doing things, as in the example of maintaining a 
communal approach to tourism through the use of communal tour operators as opposed to 
private ones.
Since the Galibi co-management arrangement essentially covers one resource for 
which there does not exist a rigorous local CPR management system, integrating local 
CPR management systems with state resource management systems is not as important as 
in other examples from the literature. However, the integration of local customs and 
values is important. While the different management cultures and manner of resource use 
(such as communal as opposed to individual) are important, recognition of traditional 
lands is the primary concern. Village residents are more concerned with the recognition 
of traditional land rights and the effects of access regulations governing a nature reserve 
that is considered to be their traditional land, which would allow for the continuation of 
their traditonal activities and customs.
In summary, the Galibi co-management arrangement has been effective in linking 
conservation and development at the local level. Through the use of tourism dependent 
on the conservation of the sea turtles, the success of development activities is dependent 
on successful conservation. The co-management arrangement has also been effective at 
involving local participation in the planning, design and implementation of activities and 
regulations. However, while the integration of CPR management systems with state 
management systems is not as important in the Galibi case study, the co-management
102
arrangement has not dealt adequately with the integration of local values and customs as a 
result of the failure to recognize traditional land rights. The following chapter will revisit 
these findings by providing some recommendations and conclusions.
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions and Reconunendations
The Galibi co-management arrangement is a viable framework that allows for the 
integration of conservation and development by involving local people. While it is not a 
perfect arrangement, it has been effective in linking conservation to local development 
activities. It has generated greater local participation in conservation and greater 
awareness of conservation issues. However, there are a number of areas in which the co­
management arrangement could be improved, particularily with the resolution of the 
tradtional land rights issue.
The goal of this chapter is to re-examine the three guiding questions of the thesis, 
in light of the Galibi co-management arrangement, which will form the basis for 
conclusions. Following the conclusions, recommendations will be made for improvement 
of the co-management arrangement.
7.1 Conclusions
The first thesis question deals with the effectiveness of co-management in the 
integration of conservation and development objectives. In this area the Galibi co­
management arrangement has indeed allowed for the integration of conservation of the 
sea turtle with nature tourism development activities. The literature on conservation, 
whether it be about ICDPs, decentralization, devolution or community-based 
conservation, stresses the need to generate local economic benefits in order to engage 
local residents in conservation activities. Through co-management, local stakeholders can 
generate local development activities that accommodate conservation objectives. The 
Galibi example benefits from the simplicity o f the single purpose conservation objective
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of sea turtle conservation and the relative isolation of the region that limits outside 
stakeholders. In such a situation, the number of stakeholders is reduced which makes it 
easier to create conservation and development linkages. With the involvement of 
proponents of local development and of conservation working together, mutual solutions 
to local development and conservation issues are generated which has enabled the 
integration of conservation and development. The closure of off-shore fishing during the 
primary sea turtle nesting season was frequently offered as an example, by both 
government and local representatives. The co-management arrangement between the 
Nature Conservation Division of the Forest Service, STINASU, STUDINAL and village 
residents has been effective at integrating local tourism development with the 
conservation of the sea turtle.
An interesting avenue for further research would be to examine the relationship 
between co-management arrangements and how conservation and development were 
linked. More specifically, is it possible to link conservation and development without 
effective co-management? Alternatively, can co-management be effective without linking 
conservation and development activities? It is unclear in this research whether effective 
co-management has led to conservation and development linkages, or whether the 
creation of conservation and development linkages has led to effective co-management.
The second thesis question refers to the ability of co-management to lead to 
greater local participation. Without question, there is greater local participation in sea 
turtle conservation because of the co-management arrangement. The question that 
remains is whether co-management provides greater opportunities for local involvement 
in conservation and development than other approaches.
The Galibi co-management arrangement includes local participation beyond
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merely consultation. Local objectives are expressed through the consultation committee, 
where the views and concerns of local representatives are not merely consulted, but can 
affect the outcome of management decisions. The arrangement between STINASU and 
STIDUNAL leaves local development entirely in the hands of local residents, through 
STIDUNAL. However, STIDUNAL has been criticized for promoting the interests of 
those involved in tourism and not the interests of the wider village community. One other 
problem relates to the method of developing local economic benefits. Nature tourism as a 
form of local development was not a local initiative, was not embraced by the entire 
village, and therefore, has limited local participation.
Unfortunately, it was not possible to determine conclusively whether greater local 
participation has led to more effective conservation or development. Data on sea turtle 
populations is sporadic and incomplete, especially over the last decade, and it was 
impossible to obtain the economic impacts of local nature tourism development. It is, 
therefore, difficult to determine if greater local control leads to more effective 
conservation and development or more effective species management. However, in order 
for greater local participation to occur in nature tourism as a form of local development, 
and in turn local conservation, greater economic benefîts must be generated as an 
incentive.
The final question in this thesis relates to whether co-management allows for the 
integration of classical environmental management with local common property resource 
management systems. Due to the unique situation of the Galibi Nature Reserve's primary 
focus on sea turtle conservation and the lack of common property rules governing sea 
turtle egg collection, the integration of state-led environmental management with local 
CPR management systems was not as important an issue for sea turtle conservation. The
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integration of local customs and values into the manner in which the co-management 
arrangement works, however, is more important.
By allowing local development to proceed on a communal basis, as opposed to an 
individual one, greater participation in the co-management arrangement has been 
achieved. While not everyone participated in tourism development, the entire village 
benefited from it.
The co-management arrangement has not been able to integrate state views on 
property with local views of traditional land rights. So far, the co-management 
arrangement steps around this difficult issue. Local residents and representatives view the 
nature reserve as existing within their traditional lands, and government representatives 
continue to overlook such claims, and the issue of ownership or property rights is not 
discussed through the co-management arrangement. The result is that many local 
residents resent nature reserve regulations that interfere with what they perceive to be 
their traditional lands. Some local residents are also unwilling to participate in activities 
that appear to increase government participation and control in the area.
7.2 Recommendations
The Galibi co-management arrangement is effective. However, there are a number 
of areas in which it could be improved. This section will examine potential avenues for 
change and the constraints for change at the local, national and international level.
Two of the main problems with the Galibi co-management arrangement deal with 
generating greater economic benefits in order to increase local participation in 
conservation and development, and with resolving the differences in views over land 
rights. The resolution of the land rights problem has the potential to solve both problems 
and to improve conservation and development in the area by granting greater local control
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over resources, which in turn, would result in greater benefits to local residents.
However, the recognition of land/traditional rights is always a difficult issue and there are 
a number of constraints to this solution. The government, the Forest Service, STINASU 
and the various international conservation organizations are all concerned about losing 
their control over actions in the area.
However, a compromise is possible that would further strengthen the co­
management arrangement for the Galibi Nature Reserve. Under the current arrangement, 
STINASU, under the supervision of the Forest Service, is responsible for all nature 
tourism in Suriname. They obtain revenue from tourist bookings, lodgings, food and 
services and contract out the transport of tourists to STIDUNAL. However, STINASU's 
resources are limited and they are only active in a few of Suriname's nature reserves.
Over time, under the current co-management arrangement, STIDUNAL could take 
over STINASU's role in the Galibi nature reserve. There are numerous examples of 
indigenous controlled forest reserves (Cox and Elmqvist, 1992) and partnerships between 
aboriginal groups and government for national park management (Hawkes, 1996; DeLacy, 
1993; Davis and Weiller, 1992) that resolve land rights conflicts and generate greater 
local control over resources, while maintaining effective management. With such an 
approach, greater benefits would be received by the local residents, there would be greater 
local control over resources and STINASU would be free to become more active in other 
nature reserves that are currently neglected.
With such a proposal, STIDUNAL would gradually take over the relationship that 
currently exists between STINASU and the Forest Service for the Galibi Nature Reserve. 
The Forest Service would remain the ultimate authority and play a supervisory role, as it 
does now, but it would be STIDUNAL that organizes, runs and profits from nature
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tourism and conservation. Such an approach would require a significant amount of effort 
to involve local residents in the organizational, technical or managerial training necessary 
for conservation and development activities.
By strengthening the role of STIDUNAL in the Galibi Nature Reserve, the linkage 
between conservation and development at the village level would be strengthened. Local 
participation in conservation and tourism would result at all levels, in the planning stages, 
implementation stages and there would be an increase in economic benefits. With greater 
responsibility at the local level, it is also more likely that nature tourism would receive 
more widespread support. With the transfer of authority to the local-level, greater local 
control over land and resources that are considered to be traditional territory would exist. 
The issue of property and traditional land rights would be addressed through partnerships 
between the local community, STIDUNAL and the Forest Service, where the local 
community and STIDUNAL would have the authority for conservation and development 
activities in the area, under the supervision of the Forest Service.
STINASU would also benefit from such a proposal. By gradually shifting control 
of nature tourism in the Galibi Nature Reserve to STIDUNAL, STINASU would be able 
to gradually increase its presence in the other nature reserves. The loss in revenue from 
the Galibi Nature Reserve could be off-set by implementing new nature tourism ventures 
to the other reserves that are currently neglected.
Such an approach would take time to implement. It would have to be established, 
through training and gradual increases in control, that local-level management has the 
capacity for effective resource management. It would also require a significant increase in 
the trust between local residents, STIDUNAL, STINASU and the Forest Service. By 
increasing local capacities and by increasing the trust between all stakeholders, those with
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current authority (STINASU and the Forest Service) would be prepared to transfer that 
authority to the local level. This would also be an important step in the implementation of 
the peace accord that was signed in 1992 between the government of Suriname and the 
Amerindian and Maroon communities.
Under the current co-management arrangement, many of the problems associated 
with conservation and local residents have been addressed. Local residents receive 
benefits from conservation and they no longer perceive nature reserve regulations simply 
as a control over their access to resources. The people park conflicts have been reduced 
and a forum for discussion of such conflicts has been created. The co-management 
arrangement has been successful in generating options to balance the development 
objectives of local residents with the national and international objectives of sea turtle 
conservation. However, the single greatest constraint to the improvement of the Galibi 
co-management arrangement is the issue of traditional land rights. The resolution of that 
issue will require continued improvements in good will and trust between all those 
involved. The challenge for improvement of the arrangement rests with the ability to 
increase local satisfaction with the co-management arrangement for the Galibi Nature 
Reserve without compromising the government and international conservation 
organization's sea turtle conservation goals.
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Appendix 1
Guiding Questions for Interviews
Guiding questions were used in interviews with key people from the village,
NGOs and government that correspond to the following framework.
1) what is occurring at the local level in terms of conservation and development?
- what incentives/barriers exist in terms of local resource management, 
local culture and traditional knowledge and the local ecosystem?
- who is involved?
- what are the objectives?
2) what is going on at the national level in terms of conservation and development?
- what are conservation/development goals, economic implications and 
department policies?
- who is involved?
3) what is going on at the international level?
- what is the role of international NGOs and donors, international agreements?
- who is involved?
- what are the objectives?
The answers to these questions were used to determine what the effects of local, national 
and international interactions are on the ability to pursue conservation and development 
initiatives through co-management. It was hoped that such a framework would provide an 
indication of whether co-management is a viable option for the integration of 
conservation and development, as well as why, why not and how.
